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In contrast to the limited impact of aggregate-level productive development 
policies (PDPs) in Argentina, micro-level PDPs in several sectors have proven 
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ANPCyT      National Agency on Scientific and Technological  
Promotion  
ANR     Non-reimbursable  grant 
ARAI       Reimbursable  grants  to  institutions 
AT     Technological  assistance 
BF     Biotechnology  applied  to  food 
BHH     Biotechnology  applied  to  human  health 
BNA        Banco Nación Argentina   
BPA       Biotechnology  applied  to  plants  and  animals   
CAE     Credits  for  the  technological modernization of firms 
CAEFIPP    Credits  to  firms  for  the financing of pre-competitive  
projects 
CAI     Credits  to  institutions 
CIDETER    Cluster  of  farm  machinery manufacturers in Southern Santa  
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CIMMYT    International  Center  for the Improvement of Corn and  
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INPI         National Institute of Intellectual Protection  
INTA     National  Institute  of  Agricultural  Technology 
INTI     National  Institute  of  Industrial  Technology 
IPR     Intellectual  property  rights 
ISI     Import  substitution  industrialization 
ISPG     Industry-specific  public  good 
LTPG     Local  technological  public  goods 
MERCOSUR      Southern Cone Common Market 
MNC     Multinational  corporation 
PA     Precision  agriculture 
PDP     Productive  development  policies 
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PMT       Technological  Modernization  Program   
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SICAR     System  of  venture  capital  investment 
SME     Small  and  medium  enterprises 
SOE     State-owned  enterprise 
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  31. Introduction 
 
Argentina’s lackluster productivity growth performance in the past decades (total factor 
productivity has grown less than 1 percent per year on average since the mid-1970s) suggests 
that productive development policies (PDPs) failed to make a difference at the aggregate level. 
However there are several cases of PDPs that appear to succeed at the micro level. 
This study seeks to understand how these PDPs succeeded against the odds (macro and 
political stress, rapidly changing institutional environment and priorities), what kinds of 
mechanisms were generated to ensure adaptation and learning, and how they evolved. The case 
study analysis focuses on understanding the extent to which these PDPs enable the emergence of 
platforms, defined as channels for enabling different possibilities for the technological 
modernization of different sectors and for the development of new goods and processes.  
We are concerned not only with the policy design and implementation and the matching 
of market and government failures with policy instruments, but also with the actual process of 
policymaking: a) who the stakeholders are, how they interact and how much weight each one 
brings to shaping the PDP, and b) whether the interests of the private and public sectors are 
aligned and what facilitates or hinders this alignment. 
In order to shed light on these issues, we present the results of case study analysis of the 
Argentine Technology Fund (FONTAR), a horizontal PDP; the National Institute of Agricultural 
Technology (INTA), a vertical PDP; and the biotechnology sector, specifically how it 
successfully makes use of market interventions and public inputs. 
FONTAR is in charge of designing and implementing financial instruments and subsidies 
that support business-oriented technological innovation and the acquisition of larger 
technological capabilities, especially by small and medium enterprises (SMEs), and the provision 
of technological infrastructure and services by public sector institutions. 
  INTA provides public inputs in the form of technological assistance and technology 
transfers. Most of its interventions result from a close interaction with the private sector, which 
facilitates coordination. We analyze both its general functioning and two specific success stories: 
a) the development of new varieties of genetically improved rice, and b) the key role of INTA in 
the introduction of precision agriculture technologies in Argentina through its extension 
activities, which contributed not only to technological modernization but also to the creation of a 
platform for continuous introduction of new technology arrivals. 
  4  Biotechnology is a success story in Argentina. The emergence of these sectors has 
benefitted from horizontal support from FONTAR and from the vertical provision of public 
inputs by INTA.  
The methodology employed in this research involves a case study analysis of each set of 
PDPs. We interviewed relevant actors from the private and public sectors that participate in each 
sector and activity supported, and we analyzed relevant information from secondary sources. 
Section 2 provides a historical overview of PDP in Argentina. The analyses of the case 
studies on FONTAR and INTA are respectively presented in sections 3 and 4. Section 5 briefly 
illustrates the use of different horizontal and vertical PDPs by biotechnological firms. The 
conclusions are presented in Section 6. 
 
2.  Historical Overview of Productive Development Policies in Argentina 
 
Between the end of World War II and the mid-1970s, PDPs took the form of import substitution 
industrialization (ISI). The main policies were tariff and non-tariff barriers to imports, explicit 
and implicit agricultural export taxes (through marketing boards), multiple exchange rate 
regimes, and subsidies and tax credits for investment in the manufacturing sector. Although 
protection was granted across the board, certain industries like machinery, automobiles, and 
shipbuilding were targeted.  
In the initial stage, which lasted until the late 1950s, protectionist policies focused on 
light, labor-intensive industries. The heavy reliance of these industries on imports of intermediate 
inputs, together with the discrimination of agricultural exports, led to frequent shortages of 
foreign exchange and to the introduction of barriers to imports of capital goods (to prioritize 
imports of intermediate goods), which considerably increased the price of these goods and hurt 
investment.
1 In a second stage, emphasis was placed on the development of heavy industries 
through foreign direct investment (FDI) and state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which produced 
intermediate inputs to substitute the imports of petrochemicals, steel, aluminum, pulp and paper, 
energy, transportation, and others.  
ISI was deemed to have both positive and negative effects (see Chudnovsky and López, 
2007). Its pros included productive diversification, some technological learning, and the 
                                                 
1 Taylor (2003) estimated that the distortions in the price of capital had an annual growth cost of 2 percentage points 
per year between 1945 and 1990. 
  5emergence of an urban middle class. Its cons included: a) the inherent tendency to cause 
macroeconomic and external instability, b) the poor quality and high costs of local goods 
(because of small market size, as well as insufficient competitive pressure and technology flows 
towards the country), c) exacerbation of income inequality, d) the discouragement of and/or lack 
of incentives for exports, and e) the embedded incentives to engage in rent-seeking activities 
rather than innovation.  
The creation of SOEs improved the availability of critical inputs, reduced but did not 
eliminate the shortage of foreign exchange, solved some coordination failures, and generated 
some technological learning. However, the prevalence of political criteria to manage these 
companies led to bloated payrolls and political pricing which contributed to growing fiscal 
deficits and to low investment in these firms, together with misallocation of investment.  
Tariff protection and other PDPs attracted multinational corporations (MNCs) to some 
strategic sectors. These firms acted as providers of technology and capital and contributed to 
some development of specialized inputs and training of the labor force of local suppliers, but not 
to an extent that generated large spillovers to local companies. Multinational corporations were 
mostly attracted by the possibility of avoiding the tariff, usually working at suboptimal scales 
with large unit costs.  
Import substitution industrialization fell apart in the mid-1970s, mostly because of the 
considerable macroeconomic and external instability associated with it, together with the 
accumulation of large deadweight losses. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the military 
government initially liberalized imports of final goods but continued to protect critical inputs 
produced by SOEs. It introduced a negative effective rate of protection for manufacturing 
activities which, together with a large real exchange rate appreciation, was highly detrimental to 
manufacturing firms. The military also introduced a national industrial promotion program that 
subsidized projects to produce intermediate inputs in large capital-intensive plants (Kosacoff, 
2000). These projects, implemented between 1976 and 1990 but mostly while the military 
government was in power, would have made more sense under the previous ISI regime. The 
military also implemented a regime that fostered investments in less developed provinces, 
largely specialized in the final stages of the production process in order to maximize tax 
deductions (Chudnovsky and López, 2007). These schemes, which had large fiscal costs, lacked 
transparency and did not include performance requirements, were eventually discontinued. 
  6During the 1980s, the isolation from the world economy caused by the debt crisis of 1982 forced 
a new closure of the economy, while the chronic fiscal imbalances, largely associated with 
SOEs, left very little room to finance PDPs.  
The early 1990s saw a shift towards financial and trade liberalization, deregulation, 
privatization, and attraction of FDI. PDPs were not abandoned, but there was less emphasis on 
them, and now they were geared towards enhancing competitiveness vis-à-vis imports in a more 
open environment, albeit with more faith placed on giving the right market signals. There were 
both horizontal and vertical PDPs, and a more demand-driven approach prevailed in the latter. 
The formation of MERCOSUR in 1995 provided a boost to the manufacturing sector, leading to 
fast-growing intra-industry trade with Brazil (with horizontal specialization) until 1998.  
During the 1990s, the manufacturing sector shed less efficient firms and jobs in order to 
gain international competitiveness and compensate real exchange rate appreciation with higher 
labor productivity, leading to large-scale destruction of manufacturing jobs.  
Productivity gains and technological improvements were attained but were not enough, 
together with the existing PDPs, to compensate for the devaluations in the currencies of 
Argentina’s trading partners in the late 1990s (especially Brazil), and the costlier and scarcer 
credit associated with private capital outflows. Industrial relocation towards Brazil, together with 
a sizable firm exit process in many sectors characterized by sequential production processes, also 
weakened the competitiveness of surviving firms. The agricultural and service sectors underwent 
significant technological modernization, due both to FDI and the provision of important public 
inputs. Macroeconomic and regulatory stability and improved access to public utilities were 
important horizontal public goods until 1997, but deteriorated thereafter. 
  Throughout the 2000s, there has a been a greater emphasis on PDPs, geared towards 
enhancing competitiveness with an eye to competing in global markets and targeting more 
sectors and clusters than in the past. However, the overall policy environment has not favored 
targeting global markets. Manufacturing exports have grown significantly because of a 
competitive real exchange rate and world trade growth, but they have also lost sizable world 
market share (the opposite of Brazil). The attitude toward FDI has not been very favorable (and 
the debt arrears with the Paris Club do not help either), causing FDI flows to Argentina to fall 
significantly, losing its sizable share of FDI flows toward Latin America and the world.  
  7  The most important PDPs, in terms of the number of specific programs and the allocated 
budgets, are those that horizontally target SMEs, investment, and exports. The most common 
instruments used to support SMEs are subsidized credits to finance investment, working capital, 
and exports.  The Ministry of Production also has a Guarantee Fund that supplies collateral for 
SMEs.
2 The second most commonly used instruments are subsidies or tax credits for the 
purchase of capital goods. 
  The most common policies used to support investment are subsidized loans and tax 
breaks. The main instrument is Law 25.924, which introduces several subsidies, such as the 
immediate reimbursement of the value-added tax (VAT) on investment, the possibility of an 
accelerated amortization of investment (to reduce income taxes), and the reimbursement of the 
technical credit on VAT.
3  
There are about 26 export promotion programs, most of which are horizontal, although 
some of them focus on certain regions and others on SMEs. More than half use market 
interventions, such as subsidized loans, non-reimbursable grants, export processing zones, export 
drawbacks, VAT reimbursement, temporary admission regimes, long-term post-shipment loans, 
and other tax break and financing programs. About one-third provide public inputs in the form of 
marketing information, training of managers for exporting, assistance of managerial re-
organization for exporting, organization of trade fairs, and so on.
4 There are no relevant PDPs to 
compensate for the information and coordination externalities that may hinder self-discovery, 
which is reflected in the stagnant export sophistication and scant diffusion of new exports during 
the past two decades (see Sánchez et al., 2008, and Sánchez and Butler, 2008). Other relevant 
                                                 
2 Support to SMEs receives a large amount of resources. Almost US$100 million were allocated in the 2008 national 
budget to this end. Most of the support programs are implemented by the SSPEPyME, which runs 22 programs. 
Most of the PDPs are horizontal, although there are a few vertical programs for SMEs, in the software, tourism, and 
agriculture sectors. There are also several other government offices (both at the national and provincial levels) that 
have programs to support SMEs. This is a very large set of PDPs from a budgetary point of view. Just to give one 
example, the Régimen de Bonificación de Tasa de SSEPyME has a budget of AR$700 million. 
3 There are other accompanying regimes (such as Law 25.988 and Decree379/2005), which introduce additional tax 
breaks on investment. The Secretary of Industry at the Ministry of Economy is in charge of designing and 
implementing these programs. Then there are several programs that subsidize credit to investment, mostly targeted 
to SMEs (discussed above). Most of these programs are horizontal in nature. There are vertical programs that 
promote sectoral and/or regional investment. 
4 About 15 percent of the export-related PDPs offer a combination of market interventions and public inputs, such as 
the Exporters Group program, run by the export promotion agency and a private foundation. There are some special 
export-support programs that specifically target: a) exporting SMEs b) regional exports, c) some sectoral exports 
(domestic SMEs that export software), c) some specific activities (like the turnkey export regime), and d) the 
formation of export consortia that share some fixed costs of exporting (logistics, etc.). 
 
  8horizontal PDPs support technological innovation and promote cluster formation, mostly through 
market interventions in both cases.  
  There are a small but growing number of vertical PDPs that provide market incentives or 
public inputs depending on the sectoral needs. The National Institute of Agricultural Technology 
(INTA), analyzed in this paper, has provided public inputs in the form of technology transfers to 
agriculture and to biotechnology applied to plants and animals for more than 50 years. INTA 
transfers some technology to manufacturing firms and certifies compliance with technical 
regulations. The National Commission on Biotechnology provides key public inputs by 
certifying the safety of new genetically modified organisms that have led to vast technological 
modernization of agriculture during the past two decades. There are a number of recent sector-
specific PDPs that seek to provide subsidies and financing to sectors such as software and 
biotechnology, but that have not yet had a significant impact. FONTAR is also moving in the 
direction of creating several sector-specific technology funds. Finally, non-tariff barriers (anti-
dumping policies, import licenses, technical barriers, etc.) continue to be used as defensive PDPs 
in a number of sectors. 
  The historical vacillation in attitudes toward PDPs and their rationales, coupled with a 
large turnover of public officials and lack of coordination in among relevant areas, has led to 
very little accumulation of learning for formulating the adequate PDPs, and to the lack of an 
adequate assessment and corresponding strategy behind the PDPs. Interviews with tenured public 
officials in areas related to PDPs reveal that during the past 20 years there has been an apparent 
deterioration in the institutional setting, which has resulted in poor capacity to identify priorities 
and design and implement adequate policy instruments.  
 
3.  PDPs for Technological Innovation: The Case of FONTAR 
 
Technological innovation and research and development (R&D) are relatively scarce in 
Argentina. Total spending on R&D in 2007 amounted to 0.5 percent of GDP, significantly less 
than relevant comparators. Additionally, a disproportionately large share of the total research 
effort in Argentina is undertaken by the public sector.
5 
                                                 
5 R&D spending relative to GDP is 0.7 percent in Chile, 0.9 percent in Brazil, 1.1 percent in Spain, and 2.7 percent 
in the United States.  Private sector participation in total R&D spending in Argentina never exceeded 25 percent, 
whereas in countries like the United States, private sector participation is around 60 percent. 
  9The dearth of innovation appears to be especially important in the manufacturing sector.
6 
Nevertheless, some sectors, such as biotechnology, farm machinery, and chemistry, display high 
intensity of technological innovation and are close to the world technology frontier. Innovation 
appears to be more widespread in the agriculture sector and the services sector, particularly 
software.  
The Scientific and Technological Cabinet (GACTEC) is in charge of defining science and 
technology (S&T) policies and national priorities.
7 It proposes the budget for support to this 
activity and evaluates the accomplishment of the multi-year S&T plans.  Most of the instruments 
used fall in the category of financing, although some PDPs provide public inputs (testing and 
calibration laboratories, technological counselling, IPR counselling, etc.) as well. 
The public institution most directly related to technological innovation is the Ministry of 
Science, Technology, and Productive Innovation, created in 2007. This Ministry includes the 
National Agency on Scientific and Technological Promotion (ANPCyT), which manages two 
technology funds, the FONCYT and the FONTAR. 
  The Fund for Scientific and Technological Research (FONCYT) provides grants to non-
commercial basic and applied S&T projects. Its beneficiaries are mostly universities and the 
National Council of Scientific and Technological Research (CONICET) and, to a lesser extent, 
INTA and the National Institute of Industrial Technology (INTI). The grants are allocated to 
competing research projects, research equipment and infrastructure upgrading projects, 
organizational projects that generate more synergies within the national system of innovation, 
human capital accumulation in S&T, and research consortia.  
  The direct provision of public inputs to innovation is done by INTA and INTI. INTI is an 
industrial research institute attached to the Secretary of Industry at the Ministry of Production 
and whose main lines of work are technology transfers and technological assistance for the 
manufacturing sector. However, because of budgetary incentives and human resource 
limitations, INTI is more inclined to provide testing and calibration services for the private sector 
                                                 
6 Sánchez, Nahirñak and Ruffo (2006) find that the average amount spent on innovative activities by Argentine 
firms relative to sales was 1.7 percent in 2001, much less than in Brazil (4 percent).  The maximum amount spent by 
Argentine innovative firms was 2.15 percent of sales, much less than the maximum amount spent in Brazil, which 
reached 7.8 percent of sales.  
7 The GACTEC was created in 1996 and is coordinated by the Chief of Staff. It was established by all of the 
ministries and secretaries that control activities linked to S&T.  
  10rather than undertaking technology transfers and technological assistance. The latter occur only 
in some of the Institute’s regional offices.   
 
3.1 The Financing of Innovation in Argentina 
 
The difficulties faced by private firms in obtaining access to adequate financing have been 
singled out in the National Innovation Surveys as the main obstacle to innovation by 
manufacturing firms. Most of the innovation done by manufacturing firms is self-financed.
8  
Funding by ANPCyT funds (FONTAR and FONCYT) financed only 2 percent of all the 
innovation activities performed by manufacturing firms in 2004 (AR$57 million). The ANPCyT 
financed 8 percent of the spending in technological innovation by small firms, 4 percent in the 
case of medium-sized firms, and 1 percent in the case of large firms. If we focus solely on R&D 
by private manufacturing firms, ANPCyT funds financed 8 percent of these outlays in 2004. This 
survey also revealed that FONTAR was the second source, after banks, of external financing for 
innovation activities of small firms. FONTAR participated 25 percent of all loans granted by 
financial institutions to innovation activities. FONTAR was also the second source of financing 
of innovation by medium-sized firms, ranking behind suppliers and doubling the participation of 
banks, which ranked third. 
 
3.2 The Argentine Technology Fund 
 
The Argentine Technology Fund (FONTAR) is charged with designing and implementing PDPs 
that support business-oriented technological innovation and R&D. These PDPs deal mostly 
through financing and subsidizing technological modernization, R&D, the provision of 
technological services to private firms, and the provision of local technological public goods that 
enhance the technological capabilities of SMEs. 
The Fund, established in 1995, is the first Argentine program aimed at financing 
technological innovation by private firms. It has managed to sustain itself over time despite 
threats posed by macroeconomic instability since its inception.  
  
                                                 
8 Self-financing represented 72 percent of all the innovation funding for the private sector between 1998 and 2001, 
rising to 83 percent in 2004. Most of this funding came from the reinvestment of profits. According to the 2004 
National Innovation Survey, between 2002 and 2004, 74 percent of the self-financing came from the reinvestment of 
profits. 
  113.2.1  Governance Structure and Institutional Capacity  
FONTAR has a staff of 40, including experienced engineers, young engineers and economists, 
and administrative staff. It has relatively little turnover, save for the young technical staff.
9  
Most of the staff have one-year contracts, which must be renewed annually.  The renewal 
is conditioned on the continuation of funding from the Inter-American Development Bank 
(IDB), which has financed FONTAR since the outset.  A few senior positions (at the director and 
president levels) are tenured, and appointments are based on public competitions.  
FONTAR’s governance structure includes a president and a board of directors. It relies on ad 
hoc commissions that advise them on specific issues and that evaluate the technical aspects of 
the supported projects. Project financing is managed by experienced tenured technical staff, who 
advise on the project approval process.  
FONTAR is autonomous with respect to defining the support instruments. Its budget 
(U$S200 million in 2008) is financed mostly by multilateral organizations. The funding 
originating in the public sector represents only 25 percent of the total budget. 
 
3.2.2  What Policy Instruments Are Being Used?  
The first set of PDPs was implemented in 1995-1999 with financing from the IDB of U$S190 
million (Technological Modernization Program I, PMT I). There were two sub-programs, one 
run by FONTAR and another run by SECyT-CONICET. The instruments included the 
following: 
 
•  Loans to established, relatively old firms that financed mostly the acquisition 
of capital goods with embodied technological knowledge (Line 1). These 
loans were co-financed with Banco Nación Argentina (BNA), which bore all 
the credit risk. They targeted established firms that had tangible collateral.  
•  Financing of the development of technological services for business firms by 
technological and scientific institutions in the public sector (Line 3). These 
services usually entail the provision of local technological public goods 
(LTPG), such as laboratories, metrology services, and so on. These credits 
                                                 
9 The experienced engineers usually have retired from jobs in large private firms and bring valuable evaluation 
experience. Young technical staff are difficult to hire and retain because of low public sector wages compared to 
salaries in the private sector. 
  12were financed only by FONTAR, which reduced the collateral required and 
facilitated their granting.  
•  Loans with contingent repayment run by SECyT-CONICET, which targeted 
more innovative and technologically riskier projects (development of products 
or processes, construction of prototypes, etc.). If the project failed on technical 
grounds, the beneficiary only had to repay the residual value of acquired 
research equipment (Line 4). This instrument was also financed by FONTAR 
only. 
•  Small subsidies for the management of technological projects, technical 
assistance, and elaboration of business plans by SMEs. 
 
The PMT I tended to promote the acquisition of capital goods with embodied 
technological knowledge and to provide LPTG that would enhance technological capabilities in 
the private sector. It allocated 44 percent of its funds to modernization loans, 31 percent to 
credits to institutions, and the remaining 25 percent to contingent repayment loans.
10 Contingent 
repayment loans were subject to important moral hazard and were eventually abandoned. The 
financing counterpart by firms and institutions was significant, as FONTAR financed only 45 
percent of the total cost of the supported projects.  
FONTAR was consolidated when the ANPCyT was created in 1996, which granted it 
access to managing the budgetary funds established by Law 23877 on Promotion and Support to 
Technological Innovation. This allowed it to design new lines of support that better 
accommodated the different types of projects and actors involved in technological innovation. 
FONTAR could lend itself these funds, increasing access to innovative projects by firms and 
institutions that lacked the collateral required by commercial banks. The larger pool of funds and 
greater flexibility obtained as a result of these moves greatly increased the number of projects 
approved (from 22 to 350). Access to all of these instruments was granted on a non-competitive 
basis (open-window system). 
At different times between 1998 and 2007, FONTAR also financed the creation of 
“technology consultancies” (CTs), which serve as institutions that provide technological 
                                                 
10 The Line 4 instrument, which targeted technological spillovers and lack of venture capital, received much less 
funding per project than the others, probably reflecting the involved risk. The programs financed 172 projects; the 
average financing was approximately US$400,000 per project. The total amount devoted to these programs was 
US$68 million. 
  13consulting and guidance to SMEs with the ultimate goal of enhancing the ability and inclination 
of the latter to undertake innovative projects and to secure IPR. The initial CTs supported 
involved technological liaison units advising groups of SMEs mostly in the areas of technical 
assistance for quality assurance and certification, organization of production, productivity 
improvements, and business administration. In a second stage the CT program was extended to 
agricultural SMEs. The support to CTs reflects the concern of FONTAR regarding what they 
perceive as the absence of “a culture of innovation” in private firms (a public input). 
Between 1998 and 2007, FONTAR introduced a program of tax credits that could be 
applied to projects involving: a) research applied to production activities, b) pre-competitive 
technological research, and c) adapting and improving existing technologies. The beneficiaries of 
these programs were manufacturing and service firms. The maximum tax credit allotted could 
not exceed 50 percent of the project’s budget. At least half of the tax credits had to be allocated 
to SMEs.
11 One interesting feature of the program is that it entailed a system of matching grants, 
which required more information to be revealed, thus diminishing the scope for moral hazard. 
Starting in 2003, the tax credit program was tailored to four different types of projects: a) R&D 
projects by SMEs and large firms, b) technological modernization projects by SMEs, c) 
technological service projects that firms contract with public research institutions, d) 
technological consultancies in which a large firm was granted a tax credit to finance different 
types of technical assistance to its network of suppliers or of customers. 
A new program to finance technological modernization, known as PMT II, was launched 
in 2000. It was jointly funded by the IDB and by the Argentine government and included the 
following instruments:  
 
•  Credits for the technological modernization of firms (CAE), which were 
intermediated through financial institutions. 
                                                 
11 This program was held annually since 1998 (except in2001). Tax credits were allocated on a competitive basis 
(there is a call for projects every year). An ad hoc commission created by the Board of Directors of ANPCyT 
monitors the evaluation of the applications for support and analyzes the appeals for reconsideration of projects 
rejected in the first round. The total budget remained constant between 1998 and 2006, and more than doubled (in 
AR$) since 2007. However, this budget fell significantly when measured in real and dollar terms. The program 
financed 952 projects between 1998 and 2007. Total funding was US$104 million during this period (US$11.5 
million per year), and the average funding per sponsored project was US$109,000. Whenever the number of 
approved projects exceeded the availability of funds, priority was given to those projects demanding a lower 
proportional subsidy and to those that allow preserving a targeted distribution of projects among provinces. 
  14•  Credits to institutions (CAI), which continued financing the generation of 
technological services for the private sector. 
•  A new line of credit to firms for the financing of pre-competitive projects 
(CAEFIPP). The CAEFIPP could be granted directly by FONTAR after the PMT 
II regulations were modified with the consent of the IDB.
12 
•  A new line of non-reimbursable grants (ANR) or subsidies. The ANR targeted 




The goal of the ANRs was to improve the R&D, design, and engineering capabilities of 
SMEs through research units that could be located inside the firm or contracted to public 
research institutions. The ANRs were in high demand by SMEs.
14  
In contrast to the PMT I, the PMT II tended to promote R&D and improvement of the 
technological capacity of the smallest firms. The total amount allocated by the PMT II was 
AR$350 million, 1 percent of which went to the modernization loans to firms, 15 percent to the 
credits to institutions, 48 percent to pre-competitive projects, and the remaining 36 percent to 
ANR.
15  
There remains a relatively large emphasis on financing the provision of LPTG by 
institutions. The use of the ANR appears to correct for the PMT I bias toward financing 
innovation by larger firms with collateral. The PMT II additionally had more funds, although it 
distributed them to a larger number of projects. The CAEFIPP represented a response to the 
                                                 
12 These credits were aimed at the production/development of new materials, products and services; the 
establishment of new processes, services and systems; and the construction of prototypes and the performance of 
pilot tests and essays. The CAEFIPP replaced the CAE in 2003, which were discontinued because of the inability of 
banks to act as financial agents during the 2002 crisis. The CAEFIPP could not exceed US$750,000 and had 
subsidized interest rates and longer maturities than the CAE. They were initially granted on a non-competitive basis, 
but the growth in demand prompted FONTAR to allocate them on a competitive basis. 
13 The ANR could grant up to US$300,000 per firm (which became smaller with the 2002 devaluation), and up to 50 
percent of the total cost of the supported project. 
14 The excess demand forced FONTAR to generate merit rankings to allocate them. There was a preference for 
financing highly innovative projects of firms that were smaller and located in less developed regions, generated 
more jobs, and  involved collaboration with public research institutions. The demand for ANR declined in 2002 with 
the economic crisis but quickly recovered after 2003. The ANR also were used to support technological 
consultancies, business incubators, technology parks and patents. Some specific financing was allocated to 
innovative agriculture-based manufactures innovative projects in the Northwest and Northeast regions in 2002 and 
to ITC projects by SME in 2004. 
15 Between 2000 and 2006, the PMT II financed nine technological modernization loans to firms for an average of 
AR$433,000, 46 loans to institutions for an average of AR$1.1 million, 201 CAEFIPP credits for pre-competitive 
projects for an average of AR$840,000, and 1297 ANR for an average of AR$96,000. 
  15crisis by making the system for financing firms more flexible. These were very successful 
financing instruments (75 percent of the PMT II funds were used in these loans), which 
supported a large variety of new technological developments. The growth of credits to 
institutions reveals that FONTAR appeared to be prioritizing the creation of a “culture of 
innovation” and/or compensating for the lack of an adequate technological infrastructure for 
SMEs. 
  PMT III was launched in mid-2008, with resources available to finance technological 
innovation amounting to U$S280 million. These resources enabled FONTAR to continuing 
offering its existing instruments as well as offer new ones. The ANR now included the financing 
of R&D capabilities of SME (ANR-I+D), and the provision of technological services (ANR-CT) 
by public and private institutions that train technological start-ups on the relevance of, and 
processes for, patenting their technological developments. FONTAR also runs the ANR-Patentes 
program, which finances the costs of patenting for SMEs. The loans to firms (CAE) can now be 
fully granted by FONTAR without having to resort to financial intermediation. The loans to 
institutions (CAI) for the provision of technological services have been relabeled ARAI 
(reimbursable grants to institutions). Institutions charge fees to users for their technological 
services, which they use to repay the grant.
16 The ARAI are being used by municipal 
governments seeing to provide LPTGs and by local business associations.  
Other recent PDPs implemented by FONTAR include the PITEC program for financing 
technological modernization and R&D activities of groups of firms, research centers, local 
governments, and business chambers that form ad hoc associations to jointly pursue these 
projects. These instruments seek to promote synergy and spillovers among the participating 
actors.  
The World Bank is providing funding for programs that will support the creation of new 
technological start-ups that spin off from research projects developed in public institutions. It 
will be a flexible program that uses the instruments that support several classes of projects.
17 The 
World Bank will also finance a venture capital fund that will seek to leverage the funding 
                                                 
16 The ARAI are covert credits that require no repayment during the first four years and that are repaid over a period 
of 10 years. 
17 It seeks to finance the start-up from inception to the   break-even point, when it can be financed by venture capital 
(VC) funds or other financing vehicles. 
  16provided by private financiers.
18 This fund will also finance the creation of consortia involving 
public institutions that assist SME in the analysis and demonstration of technical feasibility of 
the projects and business and financial institutions that assist SMEs in the analysis of the 
economic and financial feasibility of the project.  
 
3.2.3  What is the Underlying Assessment?  
The main goal of FONTAR is to support R&D and strengthen the technological capacity of 
SMEs. FONTAR believes that this will help SMEs create linkages with public research 
institutions (universities, INTA, INTI, etc.), which will in turn enable the emergence of 
platforms.
19 
The provision of LPTG, which is vulnerable to coordination failures, is supported in 
order to enable and stimulate SMEs to move from more traditional technologies to modern, 
R&D-intensive technologies. These LTPG also help firms comply with product and process 
standards and technical regulations and to compete internationally, hence justifying investment 
in R&D. The provision of these technological services also contributes to interaction among the 
institutions and the beneficiary firms. The typical LPTG promoted is the creation of a modern 
laboratory in a region that provides technological services to firms in that region. These include, 
for example, testing and calibration labs, clinical analysis labs, and metrology services.
20 
Providing these technological services is considered the first step for SMEs to start developing 
ready-to-finance projects. 
Technological liaison units (UVT) were formed to facilitate, together with universities 
and business associations, the formulation of ready-to-finance projects and access to FONTAR’s 
support. The UVT should facilitate technology transfers from public institutions to private firms.  
 
3.2.4  Is There a Policy Learning Process? 
FONTAR learns about the need to adapt and upgrade policies mostly from observing the 
response of private firms and public research institutions to the launching of the different 
                                                 
18 The MINCYT will add U$S10 million to finance seed/angel capital. 
19 R&D and technological modernization by large firms is supported through tax credits and through CAEFIPP. 
20 Examples of these types of LTPGs include the installation of wine chromatographers in Mendoza, the metrology 
center of Universidad Austral and the labs for firms in the CIDETER cluster. The ARAI for the CIDETER cluster 
finances not only the installation of labs for the cluster firms, but also the undertaking of prospective efforts by the 
cluster coordinator. It is worth highlighting that for instance the installation of the metrology service by Universidad 
Austral was promoted by Volkswagen, with the intention of providing an LPTG for its suppliers of car parts 
(although the metrology service can also sell its services to other firms in the metal-mechanics sector). 
  17instruments and also from the ex-post detection of possible inadequacies in the conditions 
established in each call for projects. We now provide two examples of this policy learning 
process, as reported by FONTAR. 
Tax credits. The first batch of fiscal credits, which were rather generic (one size fits all), 
were not too in demand, until they were tailored to different activities (R&D, technological 
modernization, etc.). This tailoring was done after learning from the initial lack of response.
21 
FONTAR now analyzes how the demand for different instruments evolves and what types of 
projects are presented by firms. Based on this information they organize different types of tax 
credits by activity. However, they always give priority to R&D.  
  PITEC. PITECs were created in response to an ad hoc request of support for a joint 
innovative project by CIDETER (a cluster of farm machinery manufacturers from Southern 
Santa Fe). FONTAR saw an opportunity for financing innovative projects by clusters that 
included interaction with R&D activities and the provision of LPTG and technological services 
by the involved firms and public research institutions. This instrument was very complex to 
design; it was set up in 2006 and has only now begun functioning.
22  
  Other examples of policy learning include the creation of technological consultancies for 
IPR after funding with generic ARAI a technological consultancy by CETRI (a technological 
liaison unit at the Universdidad Nacional del Litoral that provided this type of service to some 
local SMEs), and the introduction of the ANR-I+D in response to demands by private firms for 
ANR that supported the installation of R&D labs within the firm that exceeded the requirements 
for the specific project. Another example is the abandonment of the contingent repayment loans 
of the PMT I because of the moral hazard involved. This problem made FONTAR replace the 
contingent repayment loans with tax credits based on matching grants.
23  
                                                 
21 For instance, they have now introduced a new tax credit for technological consultancies (CT) that supports the 
formation of CT by large firms that provide technological services in the form of advising and assistance to 
suppliers and customers (that are SMEs) for compliance with technical regulations and product and process 
standards. They are doing this because they have learned that a starting point for SMEs to engage in innovative 
activities is that they have standardized processes and that they are able to target international markets. 
22 At present, FONTAR is moving in the direction of adapting the PITEC to support joint endeavors that serve as 
technological platforms for generating broad classes of innovative projects (rather than one specific project), like the 
INDEAR in Rosario (which includes joint ventures by Bioceres, Biosidus AG, and Polo Tecnológico de Rosario in 
biotech research for plants). They are also moving in the direction of supporting the provision of club goods, such as 
LPTGs, by associations of firms and public institutions. 
23 These instruments demanded a very complex evaluation of the results of the projects supported, i.e., to the extent 
to which the project had actually succeeded or failed. There was a general trend to formulate the projects in such a 
  183.2.5  Has the PDP Succeeded Partially or Completely?  
 
Aseries of quantitative and qualitative indicators suggest that FONTAR did make a difference at 
the microeconomic level, especially for highly innovative sectors. FONTAR’s own assessment 
highlights that, through the ANR, it had a direct impact on the creation of new technologically 
based firms.
24 Between 2004 and 2006, at least 75 percent of approved projects were classified as 
having medium-high or high technological content and were financed via ANR and loans for 
pre-competitive projects, thus meeting one of the avowed priorities of the fund.  
FONTAR also noted that the emphasis given to the promotion of a larger liaison between 
firms and scientific and technological institutions is one of the biggest impacts.
25 Almost 40 
percent of the institutional loans involved public universities, and 20 percent involved INTA and 
INTI.
26 The technological liaison units (UVT), especially those belonging to public universities, 
played an important role in the institutional projects. 
At first, FONTAR approved only 10 percent of the projects that applied for support. 
Now, it approves 50 percent of the projects presented. This increase is attributed to the actions 
taken by UVT, business associations, and universities. It is also the case that a good part of the 
projects supported is presented by firms that got support in the past and that have learned how to 
formulate innovative projects with adequate financial feasibility. 
Incremental Impact on Technological Innovation. FONTAR considers that its support to 
technological innovation is not substituting for private spending, but rather complementing and 
strengthening its effect. There have been some exceptional cases where a firm has sought to 
substitute FONTAR’s support for private spending, especially in the case of credits to large 
firms. But generally they have avoided this type of deviation through an adequate design of the 
conditions required to receive support and an adequate monitoring process. In this vein, 
econometric studies by Chudnosky et al. (2006a) show that the ANR had an incremental effect 
                                                                                                                                                             
way that the results could be interpreted as failures even when, under reasonable R&D parameters, they are actually 
successes, so as to avoid repaying the loan. 
24 Out of 924 firms that applied for ANR in 2003, 71 were created at the time of the call for projects and 352 of them 
were less than 5 years old and had minimal or nil sales. 
25 More than half of the 695 projects that were evaluated in 2003 sought to link firms with S&T institutions. 
FONTAR supported institutional projects of very high technological content, such as the production of radioisotopes 
by the National Atomic Energy Commission, developments in animal virology by INTA, biotechnological 
developments by INTI, and genetics developments by the agricultural experimentation station of INTA in Obispo 
Colombres, among others. 
26 In order to strengthen technology transfers to private firms, FONTAR allows firms to include the cost of 
subcontracting public research institutions in the budget of the projects it supports. 
  19on the innovation intensity of the SMEs supported.
27 Another study by Chudnosky et al. (2006b) 
estimates the social and private rates of return of ten supported projects and found that the social 
rate of return was larger.  Finally, a study by Carullo et al. (2003) found that the technological 
consultancies supported by FONTAR had a positive impact on the beneficiary SMEs in terms of 
business and technological planning. 
  An econometric analysis performed by Sanguinetti (2005) found that FONTAR appears 
to have an incremental effect on R&D spending by the supported firms, but no incremental effect 
on total spending on innovation.  This analysis focused on all manufacturing firms supported and 
not just on SMEs, which may help explain the result. Additionally, FONTAR’s support is 
skewed towards supporting R&D activities rather than all types of innovative activities. 
Perception of Supported Firms. The perception of the officials interviewed at the firms 
that received support from FONTAR is very favorable, especially those who, after receiving 
initial support, benefitted from a learning process on how to formulate financeable projects and 
were able to obtain additional financing from FONTAR.  Some of the SMEs that received 
support consider that, while the support policies were well designed and implemented and very 
helpful to their initial development and growth, it would have been necessary to complement 
them with policies that support the growth and consolidation of young firms, for instance by 
transferring to the Ministry of Production the cases of young, successful firms that would need 
further support in other areas to continue growing.  
Large firms in the biotechnology applied to the human health (BHH) sector that have 
repeatedly used FONTAR instruments such as contingent repayment loans, tax credits, and 
CAEFIPP loans are satisfied with this support, which helped accelerate their projects (partial 
crowding-out of private spending). However they complain that the support is normally not 
sufficient to finance all of the innovation projects through the final development stages.  
Government Failures.  FONTAR considers that there is insufficient coordination with 
other related public agencies, and improvement in this area is slow.  Lack of coordination 
hinders the  growth of innovative firms after they graduate from the technological start-up phase 
with the support of FONTAR. The gaps in policy coordination include the promotion of the 
                                                 
27 These authors also found that 55 percent of the SMEs supported would not have undertaken the project without 
the support of FONTAR. Forty percent of them asserted that the ANR support allowed them to accelerate project 
implementation (partial crowding-out of private spending). On the other hand, 28 percent of the firms supported 
stated that the amount of the subsidy was not large enough. 
  20venture capital industry, adequate tax and labor regulation treatment to these firms, and the 
creation of trade capacities that facilitate the targeting of export markets. 
FONTAR highlights the lack of long-term planning in the formulation of public policies 
as a whole, which reduces the effectiveness of innovation policies. It notes, however, that there 
has been significant improvement in terms of long-term planning at the local government level.
28 
FONTAR also complains about the insufficient formality of many of the firms seeking support, 
which suggests that policy and regulatory incentives designed to bring SMES into the formal 
sector are a barrier to the provision of more extensive support to innovation. 
 
3.2.6  Sources and Allocation of Funding 
The national budget has funded FONTAR’s tax credits and a few tenured positions (25 percent 
of FONTAR’s budget in recent years) since 1998. The Inter-American Development Bank, 
which has funded FONTAR since its inception, pays for the short-term contracts of most of the 
staff and all of the instruments that are not tax credits. Additional funding from the World Bank 
finances new programs. Other funds are authorized by Law 23877. Loans from international 
organizations are granted to the Ministry of Economy, which is responsible for repaying them. 
Hence, all loan amortizations and interest payments made by firms and institutions are an extra 
source of funding for FONTAR. 
FONTAR allocates 66 percent of its funds in the form of credits.
29 FONTAR enjoys a 
high rate of repayment. It covers its financing gaps with its own savings (the Recovery Fund), 
which allows it to continue making unlimited calls for new projects to support and to sustain 
itself during the periods between IDB loans, such as during the 2002 crisis. One reason that 
beneficiaries do not default on FONTAR credits is that they do not want to be denied future 
funding. Nevertheless, both FONTAR and the ANPCyT have had to rely on credible sanctioning 
mechanisms to prevent beneficiaries from defaulting.
30  
                                                 
28 One example cited was the creation of the Ministry of Science and Technology in the Province of Córdoba, which 
has an undersecretary of technological liaison and which is working very well with a UVT created by the Unión 
Industrial Córdoba, the local stock market and the National University of Córdoba, helping private SMEs in the 
formulation of a large number of attractive ready-to-finance innovative projects. They are also working very well 
with the technological liaison office of Unión Industrial Argentina. 
29 In 2008, AR$175 million were allocated, of which AR$20 million were subsidies. While the number of projects 
supported by credits is relatively smaller, the amount financed per project is larger than for the other instruments. 
30 For instance, there was the case of one university that tried to renege on the repayment of an ARAI (or CAI), and 
the ANPCyT had to cut FONCYT funding to researchers in that university, which forced the university to comply. 
These mechanisms force universities and other institutions that apply for ARAI to come up with profitable business 
  21The sectoral allocation arises purely from the demand side. Some sectors present a larger 
proportion of ready-to-finance projects. However, the creation of sectoral funds financed by the 
World Bank reflects the growth of certain high-tech sectors, such as biotechnology, 
nanotechnology, and ICT, which have traditionally demanded more support. These sectors have 
also benefited from recent legislation designed to promote them. The IDB has directed some of 
its recent funding toward the creation of four sectoral technology funds in the areas of health, 
clean energy, manufactures of agricultural origin, and social sectors.
31 FONTAR is currently 
moving in the direction of adding vertical components to facilitate the emergence of sectoral 
venture capital funds. It is also supporting the growth of innovative SMEs that have graduated 
from their seed-capital stages. 
Between 1995 and 2006, 58 percent of FONTAR’s funding was allocated to 
manufacturing firms, 30 percent to the business services sector, and only 5.9 percent to 
agriculture.
32 The chemical industry (especially BHH) absorbed 31 percent of the funding 
allotted to manufacturing, which is consistent with the high R&D intensity of this sector and the 
technological and bureaucratic sophistication of the entrepreneurs.
33 Next comes the machinery 
and equipment industry, especially farm machinery (which is in the technological frontier), 
which absorbed 15.7 percent of all the funding for manufactures, followed by the food and 
beverage industry (15.3 percent).
34  
The largest share of the support to the business services sector was allocated to 
information and telecommunications technologies projects, especially those related to software 
                                                                                                                                                             
plans for the supported projects. This means that the technological services generated with the ARAI and sold to 
private firms must generate sufficient revenues. The projects that apply for ARAI’s support are evaluated from a 
technical and financial point of view using the same parameters as the projects presented by private firms (that apply 
for credits to support R&D or technological modernization projects). 
31 The IDB has now extended the maturity of the loans to FONTAR to a period of 6-7 years, distributed in several 
stages. In the first stage, sectoral funds are to be used as catalysts for the creation of sectoral venture capital funds by 
the private sector. 
32 Although there is significant innovative activity in agriculture, there is a dearth of projects that are adequately 
formulated by private firms in the sector. This is improving with new firms like Bioceres, which exclusively seek to 
promote R&D in the agricultural sector.  
33 A sizable share of this support went to BHH, especially to projects linked to biopharmaceutical products and to 
the development of systems and techniques for the diagnosis of diseases. 
34 The relatively large participation of farm machinery is consistent with Argentina’s leading position in precision 
agriculture and the development of direct seeding machines. Argentina is currently exporting both technological 
know-how on direct seeding and the seeding machines. Additionally, FONTAR is supporting the formation of 
innovative clusters of manufacturers of farm machinery (the CIDETER cluster) through the PITEC instruments. 
  22development, followed by the development of management and telecommunications systems.
35 
Within agriculture, the activity that received the most support is biotechnology applied to plants 
and animals.  
 
3.2.7  Enduring Macroeconomic and Political Stress 
FONTAR’s programs survived macroeconomic stress by making use of its Recovery Fund. 
Nevertheless, the economic depression of 1999-2002 put the brakes on its expansion at that time, 
as many SMEs did not use the approved subsidies not only because of the inability to provide the 
50 percent financing counterpart, but also because of the negative effect of uncertainty on long-
term investment. The loans to firms (CAE) had to be discontinued because of the inability of 
banks to continue acting as financial agents during the crisis. FONTAR reacted by negotiating 
with the IDB a change in the regulations of the PMT II, which enabled it to act as a direct lender. 
Hence, macroeconomic stress reduced the demand for FONTAR’s support.  
FONTAR survived political stress by creating external technical evaluation commissions 
that are fully independent from the government, and whose members work in research institutes 
and in the private sector and are highly respected on technical matters.
36 The commissions send 
their evaluations to the Board of Directors of ANPCyPT. If the Board agrees with the 
evaluations, they are published online.  This technical and financial scrutiny and transparency 
shelters FONTAR from political manipulation. These commissions ensure the continuity of 
FONTAR regardless of staff turnover.
37  
FONTAR’s prestige and commitment compensates for a bureaucratic environment that is 
not very favorable for pursuing a career as a government official. The technical staff at FONTAR 
has remained in office since the creation of the fund in 1992.  
   
                                                 
35 This is another technologically “hot” sector of Argentina. It is one of the successful new export activities and has 
recently obtained a sector-specific law that provides PDPs for the sector. It is also closely linked to the universities 
and made up of technologically and bureaucratically sophisticated entrepreneurs. 
36 The commissions evaluate FONTAR’s work from a technical point of view, looking at all of the supported 
projects. The commission members include university professors, the president of the Argentine Biotechnology 
Fund (FOARBI), technical staff from UIA, CONICET researchers, etc. 
37 They ensure that there are standardized procedures to be followed in policy design and implementation, and 
contribute to the policy learning process with their appraisals. The commissions renew two or three members each 
year, but there is a nucleus that is maintained. 
  234.  The Case of INTA 
 
The National Institute of Agricultural Technology (INTA) operates under the aegis of the 
Secretary of Agriculture of Argentina, but it functions autonomously. It is decentralized in a 
number of regional centers that interact closely with local producers and that conduct research 
focused on regional production needs. It has been quite successful in generating and 
disseminating new technology that is adopted by private firms and that has improved agricultural 
productivity.  
 
4.1 How Are the PDPs Used? 
 
INTA’s research is largely driven by the needs of the private sector. This demand is channeled 
through Technological Liaison Agreements (CVTs) that formalize technology transfer and R&D 
agreements and technological assistance programs (ATs).  
In the case of technology transfer agreements, INTA completes an innovative project that 
generates a technological innovation on a certain product or process. Then it transfers the 
technology to one or more firms for a certain period of time and to a certain region through a 
licensing agreement and earns royalties from this transfer. 
The R&D agreements entail a joint venture between INTA and a firm or group of firms to 
generate a new technology and market the product into which this technology is incorporated. 
The firms and INTA share their research capabilities, the costs of knowledge generation and 
dissemination, and the underlying technological and commercial risks. These agreements involve 
the participation of private firms, which participate in the financing and commercial orientation 
of the product, its adaptation to market needs, and industrial scaling up. Once the innovation is 
attained, the firm manufactures, reproduces, and markets the product through licensing 
agreements, compensating INTA through previously agreed royalties. INTA can then participate 
in post-transfer services to the customers through technological assistance services. It can also 
participate in the dissemination of the technological advantages of the innovation and in the 
detection of opportunities for deepening the agreement. This type of agreement also 
encompasses strategic partnerships formed with other science and technology public institutions 
and with NGOs that conduct agricultural research. 
  24The technological assistance services enable the transfer of pre-existing tacit knowledge 
on the use of technologies to producers, which helps them solve specific problems that they face. 
They generally help solve problems of high scientific and technological complexity.
38  
Other PDPs include the creation of technologically based firms (EBTs). INTA may sign 
agreements with entrepreneurs to support the creation of EBTs. These EBTs must be located 
within innovation technology parks (PIT) promoted by INTA. The supported EBT may cede a 
certain capital stock share as compensation for INTA’s support for the technological 
development done by the firm being incubated within the PIT. 
Finally, INTA also sells products and provides specialized technical services. In this case, 
INTA transfers codified knowledge, which is already incorporated in the product or service it 
sells. The specialized technical services involve solving technical problems such as the repair, 
assembly and operationalization of a plant, repetitive tests, quality control tests, and so on.  
 
4.2 Governance Structure 
INTA is governed by a board of directors, charged with designing institutional policies 
pertaining to INTA’s external relations and internal functioning. It has a normative 
responsibility. The board approves the signing of the R&D and Technology Transfer 
Agreements, the licensing agreements, and the technology liaison policies and regulations.  
The board’s resolutions are then implemented by the National Directorate, which is the 
top managerial echelon within INTA. The National Directorate also has a say in the design of 
internal institutional policies. It approves the AT agreements at the national level and the 
location of firms at the industrial and technology parks (PIT from now on). The National 
Directorate also decides on the allocation of the overheads arising from the CVT, AT and 
royalties, to projects that are not as easily financed through CVT but that are deemed to offer 
high social return. It also implements the system of monetary incentives granted to researchers 
participating in the CVT and AT (the FAT). The National Directorate also decides which 
technologies are subject to obtaining commercial value (through patenting and licensing 
agreements), and the mechanisms and resources used to this end. 
                                                 
38 These services can be divided in two groups according to the scope and the degree of involvement of INTA: a) 
national technological assistances, which involve the participation of several INTA operational units (see below) 
and/or demand a large institutional commitment and/or entail a very large budget and/or a high contractual 
complexity that demand the approval and contracting at a national level, and b) regional technological assistances, 
which are of regional interest and which do not require the participation of other INTA units. 
  25The National Coordination of Technological Liaison (CNVT) coordinates the 
relationship between INTA and private firms and public institutions. It is in charge of proposing 
the types of liaisons that can apply for associations with private firms and public institutions.
39  
Next come the regional centers and the research centers. The directors of the centers 
approve and sign agreements that regional in scope. They participate in the definition of the 
terms of the agreements and allocate the revenues from royalties and private sector financing to 
CVT and AT generated by the centers’ technological liaison activities. They also sign 
confidentiality agreements and materials transfer agreements that do not involve licensing 
commitments. They propose agreements on R&D, technical assistance, and technology transfer. 
There are also Center Councils, which approve each center’s participation in technology liaison 
agreements.  
Finally there are operational units, where the research is actually done, which include 
agricultural experimental stations (EEA) and research institutes. These operational units initiate 
discussions with the firms and institutions with which they will cooperate through CVT and AT. 
They participate in the commercial value creation groups for the outcomes of the CVT. They 
also help define the technical aspects of the project and its costs. The director of an operational 
unit may sign confidentiality agreements and materials transfer that do not entail licensing 
commitments. The director also proposes the development of the transfer strategy, the 
confidentiality terms of the project, the strategy for registering the IPRs, and the definition of the 
institutional benefits arising from the outcomes of the research. 
INTA’s governing bodies are made up of government officials and representatives of 
academia and the private sector. This institutional design, together with the fact that INTA 
depends both on public and private financing, increases the degree of control over the institution 
and its accountability. 
Two other important actors within the governance structure of INTA are Fundación 
ArgenINTA and INTEA S.A., public institutions subject to private law created by INTA to 
support it in the areas of knowledge generation and transfer, the administration of non-budgetary 
                                                 
39 It also creates the commercial value creation group and proposes who will be in charge of it. The CNVT manages 
the database that enables the monitoring of the implementation, advances and outcomes of the CVT, from both a 
technical and economic and financial standpoint, including the royalties obtained. The CNVT proposes the 
allocation of the overhead (FVT) and the technologies subject to obtaining commercial value, and the mechanisms 
and resources used to this end. It also defines how the technologies will be registered in the different IPR registries 
and coordinates the surveillance of the contractual and managerial aspects of the CVT. 




4.3 What Is the Goal of the PDP?  
 
The most prevalent failures that INTA seeks to compensate for are technological spillovers and 
coordination failures to provide local public goods or inputs. The choice of instruments 
(technological transfers, R&D agreements, technological assistance, and even the promotion of 
coordination among private firms at the local level) appears to be adequate to compensate for 
these failures. It must be mentioned that public research institutions play a key role in 
agricultural research across the world. 
  INTA has been increasingly moving in the direction of creating platforms to implement 
CVT. To this end, it focuses on generating and structuring innovative groups, or “nuclei,” made 
up of technicians from INTA and the private sector, which generate new knowledge through 
technological liaison agreements. The new knowledge must be directly applicable to production 
activities. Technological liaisons favor an efficient transfer of technology and have a positive 
impact on the accumulation of human capital and improvement of the research teams. The 
liaison activities are seen to be crucial for avoiding ossification, by leading to a continuous 
upgrading of skills and directing research toward areas close to the frontier. 
  In the past decade, INTA’s platform creation strategy has been based on joint R&D 
projects with the private sector and strategic partnerships with other public research institutions, 
and on the integration of INTA’s technicians with national and international R&D networks. It is 
also based on support to business incubators and technological innovation parks. 
INTA seeks decentralization of technology management as way to meet the specific 
technological demands of the regions. This decentralization has led to the emergence of some 
very successful regional research centers, although other centers are lagging. The difference in 
performance across centers reflects differences in local skills and motivation and in the ability to 
                                                 
40 INTA is responsible for the implementation of the technological liaison policies and the management and 
negotiation of the CVT. It does not participate directly in the commercialization of products and services. The 
commercialization of its own production is done through the Asociaciones Cooperadoras. The management of 
production and commercialization of primary and technological products and services is done by INTEA S.A. The 
latter also manages the revenues coming from royalties generated by the CVT. Fundación ArgenINTA is the 
technological liaison unit of INTA. It cooperates in all of the activities related to the management of INTA’s funds 
(the Fondo de Asistencia Técnica and the CVT budget), and the preparation and presentation of applications for 
support of FONTAR, the ANPCyT and the funds provided by Law 23,877. It also manages the provision of services 
that facilitate the management of technological liaison projects. 
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latter and its ability to coordinate to cooperate with INTA. 
The move toward promoting the creation of technological base firms seeks to generate 
private sector counterparts with technological capabilities that may interact with INTA in the 
generation and transfer of new technologies to regional economies. The EBT may originate from 
technological frontier developments done at INTA operational units, from the incubations of 
entrepreneurs that received specialized services from INTA, and from spin-offs of INTA 
technicians and researchers that developed a new technology or provided specialized services. 
The promotion of EBT is still incipient and needs substantial improvements in allowing and 
stimulating the mobility of public sector researchers towards the EBT, the generation of more 
public funds that finance venture capital, and subsidies and loans for the creation of new firms, 
together with tax deductions, subsidizing of consulting services, and so on.  
INTA is attempting to compensate for these failures, particularly the lack of availability 
of private financing for EBT, by making use of the technical and financial resources and 
financial support instruments that are available at INTEA S.A., Fundación ArgenINTA, and the 
Cooperative Associations of the EEA.  
INTA periodically updates its rules, procedures, and instruments in response to global 
changes in the areas of technology generation, transfer and management and to its own 
institutional learning. 
INTA is keen to lead many developments which in some cases could be developed by the 
private sector. The reason is that it can behave differently from a private monopolist and more 
effectively disseminate the new technology at lower prices or even for free. This way, it becomes 
a more powerful tool for coordinating the adoption of modern technologies by private firms. 
INTA also considers that technology licensing agreements encourage private sector financing of 
INTA’s R&D.  
The motivation for private firms to participate in CVT with INTA financing the latter’s 
research is two-pronged: a) they may benefit from the licensing rights and b) they gain access to 
technologies that are specific to their regions that the private sector may fail to provide because 
of coordination failures to provide public goods and/or insufficient research capabilities. 
 
  
  284.4  History of the Evolution of the PDP  
 
INTA was created in the mid-1950s. Initially, it generated, adapted, and disseminated non-
appropriable technologies (public goods).
41 This activity demanded the production, adaptation, 
and application of knowledge and the development of technologies that were disseminated to 
agricultural producers via rural extension programs. 
The technological changes in agriculture in the 1960s, together with the emergence of 
new techniques that used agricultural inputs with embodied technological knowledge produced 
and commercialized by private firms, prompted INTA to shift toward the development of 
appropriable technologies (private goods).
42 INTA also moved toward the transfer of know-how 
to the industry that supplies agricultural inputs and to the agricultural based manufactures. 
INTA started out by adopting foreign technologies. Then it began conducting its own 
research, while at the same time pushing for adaptation of the IPR law to the requirements of 
technological innovation in agriculture. Its initial research focused on producing seeds that were 
appropriate for local weather and soil conditions through informal agreements with local 
producer cooperatives. These producer cooperatives commercialized the seeds through informal 
contractual arrangements.  
This changed in the mid-1980s when the then-President of INTA, Ing. López Saubidet, 
created the technological liaison units (UVT) to serve as INTA’s vehicles for technology transfer 
to the private sector. These arrangements preceded the enactment of a law that gave them a more 
formal status.
43 The technological liaisons enabled the move toward research that had direct 
application in production activities. 
In order for the UVTs to advance, INTA had to overcome serious internal infighting and 
conflicts with the universities. The debate centered on the advisability of moving toward 
developing and transferring (at a cost) appropriable technologies as opposed to the then-
prevalent mode of free transfers of non-appropriable technologies through extension activities. 
                                                 
41 These non-appropriable technologies include management of cultivations; efficient techniques for planting and 
harvesting, soil; climate and water studies; studies on plagues, immunology, and plague control; management of 
cattle, cultivation improvements, usage of farm machinery, and management of water irrigations and fertilizers, 
among others. 
42 These appropriable technologies included vaccines, vegetable varieties, farm machinery, and various biological 
products. 
43 The first agreement was held with San Jorge/Bagó in 1984-1985. In 1987, an agreement on soy was reached 
between INTA and the Federación Agraria Argentina (a union of small farmers). 
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participating in CVT, and the bureaucratic impediments to moving in this direction.  
The rationale for INTA’s moving to CVT and UVT was the rapid obsolescence of 
technological knowledge in agriculture. Hence, for their research to make sense, they needed to 
proceed quickly, ensure adequate IPRs (before competitors copied the development) and rapid 
technology transfer to the private sector so that the developments could be commercialized.  
The law regulating the UVT and CVT appeared only in 1990, five years after being 
promoted by López Saubidet. Before that, INTA had been licensing technology to the private 
sector without the protection of an adequate legal framework.  
In the 1990s, INTA was subject to budgetary constraints caused by a redefinition of the 
central government’s budget priorities. In 1995, INTA lost its financial autonomy when the 
central government eliminated taxes that were specifically established to finance INTA.  Since 
then, INTA became subject to financing by the Treasury through budgeted funds. Hence, 
between 1990 and 2002, a large amount of INTA’s researchers and technicians at the regional 
centers focused on the provision of services and consulting as a source of non-budgetary 
funding, which distorted the primary goals of the CVT and generated deficiencies in the addition 
of commercial value to technological developments and in the registry of IPRs. There was an 
incentive to engage in projects and provide services that did not necessarily jibe with INTA’s 
research and technology and knowledge transfer agenda. This period nevertheless yielded 
important lessons on how to engage in CVT. There was a late process of learning and 
institutional adaptation. The funding needs intensified the move toward developing competitive, 
appropriable technologies, which generated important institutional learning.  
The crisis in the development of technological liaison policies in the 1990s also reflected 
changes in the stakeholders within INTA. Between 1987 and 1992, the technological liaison was 
a response to the enthusiasm of its initial promoters (both at the technical and bureaucratic level), 
who understood the reach and conditions for these policies. The changes in political and 
managerial authorities over time introduced new stakeholders who did not understand 
technological liaison as well as the initial promoters, and hence did not share their commitment 
to CVTs. During this period there was greater emphasis on analyzing the financial advantages of 
the signed CVTs rather than their social benefits. 
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1997-1998, when INTA generated a “white paper” on the administration of extra-budgetary 
resources, bringing administrative and institutional order to the management of these resources. 
At this time, the National Directorate of the Institute also undertook a critical review of the 
experiences, including the rules and procedures applied by the institutional policy of 
technological liaison. 
INTA’s technological liaison policy became institutionalized in 2002. This policy 
provided institutional order to decisions heretofore taken via ad hoc internal resolutions. The 
policy regulated the allocation of funds for research and other uses, the provision of incentives to 
researchers, and the fiscal treatment of this funding, and it centralized the signing of  CVTs 
agreed between regional centers and local producers, although CVTs were managed by the 
regional center involved. During this period, greater emphasis was placed on increasing the 
quantity and quality of the generation and transfer of technologies, and a clear institutional and 
policy distinction was made between the sale of services (which had exacerbated during the 
crisis), R&D agreements, and technology transfer agreements. Contractual arrangements were 
updated to facilitate long-term cooperation with private firms and the technological and 
commercial risk sharing with the private sector. The mechanisms enacted enabled the 
development of innovative nuclei comprising of all the actors participating in the CVT.  
These models were highly successful and had positive impacts on other firms in the 
agricultural sector, who sought to enter into CVT with other INTA units. The technological 
liaison also created demand for of knowledge generation and adaptation from other public 
research institutions. There were also failures arising from the application of CVT to certain 
types of frontier technologies which, because of their nature and scope, could not be transferred 
via licenses to private firms.  
The move toward technological liaison agreements in the late 1980s established a clear 
distinction between the free transfers of non-appropriable technologies to agricultural producers 
through extension services (akin to the traditional linear model of innovation, or a supply model) 
and the development of appropriable technologies, which is done at a cost via CVT (closer to a 
demand model). 
Since 2000, INTA has moved toward an intermediate system, which is neither supply-
driven nor demand-driven. It works through the “early management” of the liaison with private 
  31firms, via the maturation of ideas and conceptual sketches and the development of the 
technological business.  
Since 2005 INTA has been implementing a strategic plan (Plan Estratégico Institucional 
2005-2015) to enable institutional innovation and to place INTA at the knowledge frontier, 
generating and transferring strategic technologies. 
The move towards CVT and AT thus reflected both the goal to generate mechanisms of 
transmission of private sector needs, and to ensure non-budgetary financing for long-term 
research that is not vulnerable to macroeconomic fluctuations. 
 
4.5 Has the PDP Succeeded? 
 
4.5.1 Observed Results 
INTA has had a number of significant successes, including the development of new varieties of 
different grains, inoculants, and farm machinery. The first remarkable case was the genetic 
improvement of wheat, which resulted in higher yields and quality. It was done by the EEAs 
Pergamino and Marcos Juárez. The research began in the 1960s through an interaction with the 
International Center for Improvement of Corn and Wheat (CIMMYT), based in Mexico. 
CIMMYT is charged with transferring “intermediate international public goods” to local 
agricultural research institutions in wheat-producing countries. The local institutions then adapt 
the received technologies to local conditions.  
New varieties were developed over time and later adopted for direct seeding techniques. 
The use of new herbicides and transgenic materials facilitated the great technological revolution 
in agriculture of the past 20 years. The program also included the creation of a new private firm 
for the production and dissemination of the new seed varieties. This firm, PRODUSEM, had a 
pioneering participation in the technological liaison policy of INTA since 1987, and it engaged 
in long-term CVT with INTA that supported the wheat R&D done by INTA and the 
dissemination of the newly created varieties. Eventually more private firms signed CVT 
agreements in the area of wheat.  
Other successes include the development of the following: 
 
•  Mutagenic rice that is resistant to herbicides 
•  New technologies for the cultivation of beans in the Northwest region 
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cow disease”) 
•  A self-maceration vat for improving wine quality 
•  New horticultural varieties for the industrialization of dehydrated vegetables 
•  New inoculants for soy and alfalfa 
•  New varieties of alfalfa to be used in cattle feed 
•  A machine for inter-seeding of fodder 
•  Advanced biologic insecticide for the control of the Mediterranean fruit fly in 
apples and pears 
•  A cotton seeding machine. 
 
INTA did not participate in some of the most important technological developments in 
the sector. For instance, it did not play a role in the development of transgenic soy, the 
production of which is quite dispersed in terms of regions and number of producers. There was 
no coordination between the INTA regional centers that were involved with this crop, which 
prevented INTA from moving at the same pace as private developers.  
Although the success stories were facilitated by INTA’s institutional design favoring 
CVT, some of the successes preceded the emergence of this institutional design. Successes 
appear to have occurred in regional and research centers where there was a larger geographic and 
production concentration (which favored coordination of the private sector), where there was 
more research capacity, and where there was a greater concentration of motivated and capable 
stakeholders. 
INTA has only vertical policies, which work well because of the coordination failures of 
the private sector to provide public inputs and because of INTA’s greater ability to disseminate 
new technologies by preserving IPRs.  
Another reason that INTA is an interesting case is that it fosters the alignment of interests 
of the public and private sectors thanks to the technological liaison policies. These policies 
facilitate the emergence of new technologies through a co-movement of the public and private 
sectors based on mechanism design leading to the emergence of platforms. 
  
  334.5.2 Perceptions of Some of the Firms Interviewed 
 
INTA’s technological assistance in the area of biotechnology applied to plants and animals 
(BPA) is highly valued by the private firms that we interviewed. They consider that INTA is 
very well endowed in terms of the technical capabilities of its researchers and technicians and the 
physical and technological infrastructure to undertake different tests. Many private and public 
research projects in the area of BPA currently have AT agreements with INTA. 
 
4.6  What Are INTA’s Sources of Funding and How Are its Funds Allocated?  
 
INTA has a system of incentives to retain researchers and to generate further research through 
funding allocation mechanisms of the CVT and the royalties obtained from the successful 
projects. While these incentives are deemed to be appropriate, they are not sufficient, especially 
in view of the absence of tenured positions and tenure track paths. 
The institutional benefits of INTA come from the sale of products and services generated 
by the CVT, AT, the sale of specialized technical services, and revenues from royalties. These 
benefits are allocated in a way that contributes to the financing of research activities of INTA as 
a whole, while at the same time providing incentives and rewards to the originating units and 
researchers. 
A Technological Value Upgrading Fund (FVT) was created to finance INTA’s research. 
The Fund’s resources come from a portion of the net benefits arising from the CVTs and ATs. 
The FVT finances autonomous research that is less likely to be financed through CVTs and 
which is deemed to have high social return.
44 The FVT finances the following activities: 
 
•  Research deemed to be strategic or a priority of technological liaisons. 
•  Enhancing the capacity to manage the technological liaisons. 
•  Adding commercial value to projects that are close to being transferred and 
which may increase the net institutional benefits. 
•  The costs of registering and maintaining IPRs for vegetables, patents, 
trademarks, and other IPRs related to the transfer and dissemination of 
INTA’s knowledge and technologies. 
                                                 
44 The technical assistance agreements (AT) must provide the following contributions to the FVT: a) 20 percent of 
the total budget for the agreement, when the counterpart is a private sector firm or entity, b) 10 percent of the total 
budget for the agreement, when the counterpart is a public institution or a NGO, and c) 0 percent when the liaison 
pursues a “social goal.” 
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Type of 
liaison 
CVT AT  Specialized  technical 
services 






Information transfer  Supply of products and services 






There is a regulatory framework for providing incentives to participating researchers and 
units. INTA promotes the participation of its researchers in technological endeavors by providing 
additional payments received from the Technical Assistance Fund (FAT) and compensation for 
the generation of royalties. 
INTA recognizes the right of researchers to non-wage compensation for their 
participation in projects that generate royalties. Researchers are in turn compensated with wages 
for their regular activities at INTA.
45  
The FAT for each CVT and AT is agreed upon between INTA and the associated firms. 
It reflects the opportunity cost for the firm of gaining access to this type of technical service. In 
the cases of R&D agreements that will generate royalties, the FAT paid by the private firms is 
considered to be an advance of the royalties to be obtained. 
 
Distribution of Institutional Benefits 






CVT agreements  30%  20%  20%  30% 
National and regional AT    35%  35%  30% 
Specialized technical services  30%  40%  30% 




20%  20%  30% (Fondo Nacional de 
Publicaciones) 
 
The researchers interviewed at INTA consider that this system of incentives is adequate, 
but that it is not sufficient to retain researchers. The biggest disincentive is the lack of tenured 
positions at INTA that provide researchers a medium-term horizon for their research activities. 
As a result, most of the young researchers at INTA’s operational units are working under short-
term contracts, which leads to a high turnover rate. The permanence of the young researchers in 
the different centers is a function of idiosyncratic factors, such as prestige, the collegial 
                                                 
45 The unit’s participation in royalties also helps finance the temporary job contracts granted to the non-tenured 
researchers at the unit (which tend to be the majority). 
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innovative research groups and eliminates the risk of ossification. This shortcoming has led to 
the emergence of a widening generation gap over the past 20 years. Some research centers rely 
on “importing” researchers from CONICET.  
In the early 1980s, INTA promoted and financed graduate studies abroad for several of 
its researchers. The repatriation of these researchers was crucial for the movement towards 
technological liaison agreements and the other institutional changes observed in the 1980s. This 
policy of sending researchers abroad has been discontinued. 
In 2007, the central government decided to allocate some of its fiscal resources to the 
opening of new tenured positions at the public sector. Priority was given to incorporating the 
personnel working under temporary contracts and internships. Those INTA centers and EEA that 
had a large number of interns and other non-tenured staff benefited more from this opening. 
Since those centers that were more active in research were the ones that had the largest number 
of researchers to incorporate, this job opening may have widened the research gap between 
different regional centers and EEA. All of these constraints matter, but they have not generated 
an ossification thus far. 
 
4.7  The Development of Genetically Modified Rice 
 
Rice is produced in the Northeast region of Argentina and is mostly exported. Until 1998, the 
variety being produced was the one developed by IRGA, the public agricultural research center 
of Rio Grande in Brazil. This variety was of low quality, had little resistance to herbicides and 
low productivity, and demand for it was limited to Brazil. The large Brazilian devaluation of 
1999 rendered local rice production uncompetitive and forced 50 percent of the local producers 
out of business, or caused them to shift to soybeans.  
Starting in 1990, the INTA EEA of Concepción del Uruguay (Entre Ríos) had been 
developing , through a CVT with Fundación Pro-Arroz (a foundation of local rice producers), a 
new variety called Cambá, that had higher quality and productivity and that could be sold in 
other markets at higher prices than in Brazil. This allowed a large diversification of markets and 
greater competitiveness of local production. Fundación Pro-Arroz not only financed the research 
but also interacted with INTA in the research process. The benefits for Fundación Pro-Arroz 
were having access to this better variety and improving the competitiveness of local rice 
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the new variety and the rights for licensing the commercialization, which is done through local 
seed traders. 
INTA additionally developed a new mutagenic variety of rice called Puitá, which is 
resistant to imidazoline, a herbicide that is required to eradicate a disease called arroz colorado 
(red rice), which shares the genetic characteristics of the good rice. The resulting rice has a 
higher quality and is more productive, as eradicating this disease enables better use to be made of 
cultivation techniques. This research was financed by INTA, although there was a CVT with 
BASF-Cyanamid, a private company that provided the imidazolines that were deemed to be 
more appropriate for the rice in different locations. Once the effort was successful, INTA 
licensed the external commercialization of the seed to BASF, which is responsible for patenting 
it on behalf of INTA in each market where it is sold.  INTA retains the commercialization rights 
in Argentina and in Uruguay. This mechanism has a twofold impact. First, it further raises the 
competitiveness of local production (especially in the sub-tropical regions) by allowing an 
optimization of cultivation practices (use of better fertilizers, irrigation, etc.). Second, it places 
INTA as a worldwide leader in the development of new rice varieties of vast applications 
together with Louisiana State University in the United States. 
 
4.7.1  “Policies” of INTA-Concepción del Uruguay (Provision of Public Inputs) 
 
The origin of these policies in 1988 coincided with the return to INTA of technicians that had 
been trained abroad, which favored INTA’s involvement in technology transfer activities. This 
was the case of Alberto Lívore, a rice breeder who is one of the major public sector stakeholders 
for the rice-specific PDP. Lívore brought from the United States the blueprint for a model of 
public-private interaction for improving the competitiveness of rice production. In each rice-
producing state of the United States, there are private research foundations that associate with 
universities to conduct rice-specific research.
46 Lívore promoted the creation of Fundación Pro-
                                                 
46 These foundations, which are run by firms operating at different stages of the rice chain (production of seeds, 
commercialization, rice production, etc.), solve coordination failures by promoting laws that introduce a mandatory 
contribution to the foundation by all firms in the rice chain. The foundations’ goals are to finance R&D, technology 
transfers and the advertising required for selling the product. This financing is complemented with funding from 
other sources, such as the U.S. Department of Agriculture. This continuous funding enabled the pursuit of medium-
term research projects. The foundations additionally allow producers to engage in research agreements with non-
governmental agencies and institutions. 
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fluctuations and enable engagement in useful medium-term research.  
The Fundación Pro-Arroz was created in 1990, thanks to a common view shared by key 
private and public actors in the rice chain (researchers, agronomic engineers, rice producers, and 
especially the industrial sector that elaborates and sells the refined rice, as they have a greater 
awareness of the importance of investing in technology). This alignment of interests was 
facilitated by the geographic concentration of production and the relatively small number of 
producers involved, together with the fact that INTA-Concepción was organized in accordance 
with the same vertical PDP that the private sector wanted. The high degree of vertical integration 
in the industrialization and production of rice also facilitated this coordination. This foundation 
solved an important coordination problem, as individual producers were hesitant to invest in 
research on the genetics of grains that yielded results only in the medium and long term.  
This joint effort did not yield immediate results, but it was consolidated over the years, as 
the research done by INTA under the foundation’s sponsorship started to yield incremental 
technical results that revealed adequate capacity and built confidence.
47  
The foundation’s legal status and ability to coordinate became more solid with the 
enacting of a provincial law in 1998-99 that introduced a specific tax on all the firms operating in 
the rice chain. This tax would finance the foundation’s activities, including the development of a 
new, appropriable variety and research on cultivation practices. The foundation itself collects this 
tax.
48  
The funding secured by the 1998-99 law was added to INTA’s own budgetary resources, 
to other projects with external funding, and to CONICET’s funds to supply the necessary 
resources for medium-term research. The steady financing of the foundation provided a buffer to 
cover the eventual troughs in the other financing sources, ensuring that the fixed costs of 
research would always be covered.
  
                                                 
47 The foundation has a technical committee made up of agronomic engineers that chose the projects and evaluated 
the results. While advances in the research were being attained, it still demanded a lot of creativity to show that 
improvements were being attained without having yet reached the development of the new variety. 
48 The rice refiners withhold the taxes charged on producers. The tax rates are 0.1 percent for refiners and 0.2 
percent for rice producers. 
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variety.
49 Once this appropriable knowledge was generated, INTA sought to ensure the seed 
quality, broad distribution, and the IPRs. To this end, it signed a CVT with the foundation 
stipulating that INTA would produce and commercialize the original seeds (production was done 
in fields chosen by foundation members).
50 This mechanism ensured the quality and broad 
distribution of the seeds while preserving the IPRs.
51  
In 2005, INTA completed the development of the Pituá rice variety, which was not the 
result of an agreement with Fundación Pro-Arroz. It was financed with INTA’s own funds 
because INTA wanted to retain full IPRs over the new variety. This variety is resistant to 
herbicides without being transgenic (transgenic rice is not allowed for consumption). The 
research process began in 1996. It became successful in 2000, and the new variety was registered 
in 2005 following two years of discussion with BASF over licensing and patenting issues.
52 In 
this case, the research orientation was set by INTA itself, as the foundation would never have 
financed such an ambitious project.  
Once the variety was developed, INTA had to negotiate with BASF over licensing the 
gene. This agreement has allowed INTA to have commercial and technological presence 
worldwide and to earn sizable royalties through BASF.
53 The royalties coming from the sales of 
the Puitá variety provided the largest royalties during the last agricultural campaign. 
 
  
                                                 
49 The R&D for this variety was done by INTA, while the field tests took place in producers’ plots, as well as all the 
validation efforts done in coordination with producers and the industry. 
50 The seed traders buy these original seeds, multiply them and sell them to producers. 
51 Still there is room for producers to try to generate their own non-IP seeds and commercialize them in informal 
channels. To avoid this, the industrial firms pre-finance the inputs of its suppliers on the condition that they use 
original seeds. This control is facilitated by the relatively small number of actors involved. 
52 INTA developed rice mutations that were resistant to the imidazoline herbicides produced by BASF. These 
herbicides were chosen because they had certain attributes that allowed working with mutant rice. This research 
process was parallel to what BASF/Cyanamid was doing with Louisiana State University in the United States, which 
fed into INTA’s own research.  
53 First INTA had to ensure that the gene was different from the one developed in the United States (BASF helped 
with the sequencing of the gene). Then it had to negotiate that the worldwide patent belonged exclusively to INTA, 
while BASF held the exclusive license to commercialize the original seed (on the condition that BASF must patent it 
everywhere it sells it on INTA’s behalf, except for Argentina and Uruguay). The original or legal seed is originated 
in Argentina and sold to seed traders abroad. The original seeds then undergo successive multiplications by 
authorized traders (or seeders). 
  394.7.2  Determinants of Success of PDPs. Is it replicable? 
The keys for success of PDPs were the following: 
 
•  The presence of public and private stakeholders who had enough control over 
the required policies. 
•  The presence of highly committed and motivated public sector stakeholders, 
who had the institutional knowledge on how to ensure funding for long-term 
research. 
•  The adoption of best international practices, which ensured coordination 
between private actors in financing research and in transmitting their needs to 
INTA. 
•  The relatively small number of actors involved and their geographic 
concentration, which facilitated coordination and lobbying for a law that made 
this coordination permanent.   
•  The existence of a public agency organized in accordance with some vertical 
PDPs (this is not usually the case with other public agencies) with a private 
sector that organized itself according to the same PDP. 
•  The fact that INTA-Concepción was able to maintain the IPRs, which 
increased the public-good nature of the knowledge generated and 
appropriated. 
 
  These actually turn out to be rather stringent conditions that are not met in many other 
agricultural activities.
54  
  The rice law was relatively easy to pass because it was a provincial law.
55 The role of 
foundations that coordinate the actions of private actors is underscored by the lackluster 
experience of IRGA, the public rice research institute in Rio Grande, Brazil, that has some 
                                                 
54 In the area of cereals and oilseeds there are private associations that transmit research demands to INTA, but that 
are unwilling to finance this research because they expect to get it for free from the government. In the case of some 
strategic grains, the private sector simply lobbies for INTA to tilt its research programs in this direction, without 
contributing to finance the research. This not only reduces the chances of success of the research, but also 
diminishes the quality of the information transmission process. As a result, INTA lost the race with private 
companies that moved faster. In the case of wheat there is a competition between the associations among INTA and 
local seeders and the multinational companies. 
55 INTA is currently promoting laws to create and finance rice foundations in Corrientes, Formosa, Misiones and 
Santa Fe (the other rice producing provinces). Fundación Pro-Arroz from Entre Ríos is complaining that it is 
subsidizing INTA’s research, which has an impact on the other provinces, which free-ride on the foundation’s effort. 
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1979 (the one that Argentina produced until 1998) and another in 1988. IRGA’s research effort 
failed because of its spasmodic behavior.  
  INTA has installed a system of incentives and a policy of technological liaison 
agreements that facilitates the activities of motivated stakeholders at the operational unit level 
that may generate successful PDPs. However, the continuation of each specific PDP is largely 
tied to idiosyncratic stakeholders. 
 
4.8   The Role of INTA in the Adoption and Development of Precision Agriculture in 
Argentina 
 
Precision agriculture (PA) involves adjusting the use of agricultural inputs to changes in the 
environment (soils, humidity, etc.) with the help of electronic devices. It entails two clearly 
differentiated activities that are closely linked: a) the development of precision instruments and 
machines and agricultural inputs of high complexity, and b) the development and efficient 
application of PA techniques in the production of crops. 
  Precision agriculture enables a reduction in the cost of producing crops, increasing 
productivity and making a more efficient use of inputs. Using precision agriculture, the use of 
inputs can be managed at different times and in different places. Production logistics in the field 
can be optimized, agricultural labor can be supervised, production risks can be managed, 
differentiated products can be segregated, products used in human consumption can be traced, 
and the use of inputs and compliance with environmental protection norms can be monitored.
56 
  This technology includes the use of key tools such as GPS and electronic devices to 
gather real-time data on what is happening with different crops. 
 
4.8.1  “Policies” of INTA-Manfredi  
 
INTA introduced PA in Argentina. The Precision Agriculture Project was started in 1994-95. 
This PDP took the form of an extension activity (non-onerous technology transfers) conducted 
by INTA, which solved coordination failures in the provision of key industry-specific public 
goods. This development took place because these technicians had the capacity and commitment 
                                                 
56 It is not always profitable to adopt PA techniques. The profitability will depend on the size and characteristics of 
the parcels. Additionally, the productivity improvements (savings on inputs) are not immediate. It may take several 
years until the investment in adoption and implementation of PA technologies begins to yield positive profits. 
  41to push this agenda. INTA’s PDP accelerated the introduction of this technology. Without its 
intervention, the private sector would probably have adopted it, although much later and in a 
more disorderly fashion.  Thus, INTA’s PDP led to the early adoption of modern production 
technologies, allowing INTA to gain a competitive edge vis-à-vis regional competitors. 
  This extension activity has been fully funded by INTA. The project’s general aim is to 
develop a technological platform and a functional network devoted to improving and facilitating 
the application of technology to modern agriculture.
57 The Executive Unit for the project is the 
experimental station (EEA) of INTA at Manfredi.
58  
  The Beginning of INTA’s PA-PDP.  In the early 1990s, a group of technicians at INTA 
Manfredi started making annual technological exploration trips to the United States, to the Farm 
Progress Show, and several universities. They discovered that the latest innovation was satellite 
yield monitoring.
59 The INTA technicians saw the opportunity and the need to introduce the new 
technology in Argentina as soon as possible. The initial project budget was rather limited 
($35,000 in 1997), and financing the project required a reallocation of funds from other 
projects.
60  
  INTA had to intervene to provide this industry-specific public good (ISPG) because 
universities and research centers in the United States were willing to reveal and transfer the new 
technologies to institutions like INTA, but not to private firms. Additionally, it was difficult for 
the private sector to grasp the full potential of the new technology, which was revealed by 
INTA’s field demonstrations. INTA also helped producers with the calibration of the instruments 
to be used. Finally, INTA solved a coordination failure, as the individual investment in satellite 
yield monitors is only profitable if there is a large enough number of monitors and satellite 
                                                 
57 The stated goal of the project was to “improve the productivity, quality, and consistency of the production of 
crops, oilseeds, pasture and fodder used both for final consumption and as agro-industrial inputs.” The project 
promoted the development and utilization of highly complex tools that involve different branches of science such as 
electronics, electro-mechanics, robotics, telecommunications, systems engineering and software, applied to the 
design and implementation of production technologies that are based on adjusting techniques to the environment and 
to the development of precision agriculture machines. 
58 The project coordinator is the Agronomic Engineer Mario Bragachini of EEA-Manfredi. The project includes the 
participation of the INTA EEAs at Paraná, Marcos Juárez, Rafaela, Anguil, Salta, Faimallá, Sáenz Peña, Pergamino, 
the INTA Institute of Rural Engineering at Castelar, and the INTA headquarters. 
59 This monitoring allowed identifying environmental differences (climate, soil conditions, humidity) within a same 
production unit or parcel, and using that information to adjust the use of variable inputs to the conditions prevailing 
in each part of the plot. 
60 There were only five agronomic engineers from INTA working on the project at the beginning, but the private 
sector’s growing demand for access to the new technology has led INTA to start incorporating more technicians into 
the project. 
  42correction towers installed by other producers. The technicians at INTA-Manfredi undertook this 
PDP without relying on a technological assistance agreement because they were convinced of the 
role leading of INTA in the provision of ISPG for agriculture.  
 
4.8.2  Characteristics of Public-Private interaction around the PDP 
 
INTA introduced the new technology with the logistic support of private sector firms that were 
linked to INTA-Manfredi, such as D&E, Tecnocampo, Agrometal, A&T, Agrimax and Acopio 
Arequito, among others. These firms include crop producers, suppliers of agricultural services, 
and manufacturers of farm machinery. The cooperation in the introduction of PA was facilitated 
by the long-standing public-private interaction through INTA extension activities. 
  The first important cooperation was done with technicians from the D&E firm, using 
technology imported from the US to draw the first satellite map.
61 Subsequently, PA started to 
develop quickly. D&E used technologies and financial backing from Trimble in the United 
States to install a GPS satellite correction tower at a reasonable cost in the Province of Santa Fe, 
which is located in a strategic position within the Pampa Húmeda, and covers a 300km radius. 
This enabled the diffusion of satellite flaggers, which in turn facilitated the diffusion of PA 
technologies. In 1996, two new towers were installed in the Provinces of Buenos Aires and 
Tucuman, which enabled the application of GPS to agriculture. 
  The first satellite maps were done in 1995. In that year, the first seeding machines with 
variable dosage were used.  These machines were initially imported. The diffusion of the 
technology later on created a market for the local production of this type of machine. INTA’s 
diffusion strategy includes the organization of three-day training courses every year that included 
technological exhibitions by participating firms.   
 
4.8.3  Advantages of Early Adoption: a Measure of the PDP’s Success 
Early adoption gave Argentine producers a competitive edge vis-à-vis their Brazilian 
counterparts, which it retains to this day. In 2008, the rate of adoption of PA in Argentina was 
substantially higher than in the rest of the countries of the region, and it was also quite high 
relative to the rest of the world. In Argentina, 5 percent of all producers are currently using PA 
                                                 
61 D&E is a firm devoted to the development, manufacturing and adaptation of top technology for the production of 
agricultural and agro-industrial products and foodstuff, and which represents in Argentina the US technology 
suppliers Trimble and AgLeader firms. 
  43(satellite yield monitors), and the capacity exists to raise the adoption rate to 40 percent of all 
producers in five years. Argentina is ranked second in the world in terms of the rate of adoption 




















Brazil  18.000 6.000 2.000 1.300 1.200 10
Argentina 9.000 8.000 4.500 1.000 400  300
Other Countries  2.000 1.200 1.000 50 50  25
Total  29.000 15.200 8.000 2.350 1.650 335
Source: Proyecto Agricultura de Precisión, INTA, D&E.
Adoption of PA tools, Latin American countries (2008)
4.8.4  Diffusion of Precision Agriculture in Argentina 
The adoption of PA tools has grown exponentially in recent years. The growth in adoption is 
measured by the diffusion in the acquisition and use of the different machines and equipment 
required by PA. The following table shows the evolution of the Argentine market for equipment 
and agricultural inputs used in PA.  
 
 
Equipment 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008*
Yield Monitors 50 200 300 450 560 600 850 1300 1600 2500 3600 4500
Yield Monitors with GPS 25 75 155 270 400 420 600 900 1300 2200 3300 4200
Yield Monitors without GPS 25 125 145 180 160 180 250 400 300 300 300 300
Variable rate seeding and 
fertilizing applicator
3456 1 0 1 2 2 5 4 0 8 0 4 2 0 7 0 0 1 0 0
Variable rate fertilizing applicator 
(liquid)
00000000 5 0 8 0 2 1 5 3 3
Interactive Seeding monitors 400 500 700 1000 1300 1500 1800 2200 3000 4200 6500 8000
Satellite guidance systems in 
planes
35 60 100 160 200 230 300 450 480 550 680 690
Satellite guidance systems in 
pullverizing
0 10 70 200 400 500 2000 3000 4000 5000 7600 9000
Automatic Guidance Systems in 
pulverizing machines
00000003 2 5 5 0 1 8 5 4 0
A c t u a l  t i m e  s e n s o r s 002245677 1 2 1 5 1 5
E l e c t r o c o n d u c t i v i t y  s e n s o r s 000000000245
*Until September 2008
Evolution of the Argentine market for equipment and agricultural inputs used in PA




                                                 
62 If we measure the rate of adoption by the number of yield monitors per area planted, Argentina ranks fifth after 
the United States, Denmark, Sweden, and Great Britain, and it has a higher rate than Australia and Holland. The 
leading positions of Denmark, Sweden, and Great Britain can be explained by their smaller surface areas and more 
intensive agricultural practices. 
  44The average growth rate in the stock of PA machines and high complexity components 
was above 20 percent per year between 2003 and 2007, leading to a cumulative 290 percent 




Equipment Change 2008/2007 (%)
Yield monitor 27%
Variable rate applicator for seeds and 
fertilizers (solid)
42%
Variable rate fertilizer applicator (liquid) 56%
Monitores de siembra  33%
Banderilleros satelitales en aviones  2%




Fuente: INTA Manfredi – Proyecto Agricultura de Precisión
Increase in PA equipment
 
4.8.5  Determinants of Success of PDPs 
This non-appropriable technology transfer was facilitated by the fact that INTA-Manfredi, 
through its previous extension activities, had established a network of public-private cooperation. 
The regional concentration of the firms involved in Southern Santa Fe and Southern Cordoba 
also contributed to the transfer.  
The creation of a platform through extension activities facilitated the adoption of the new 
technology and may lead to the generation of other classes of solutions for the sector in the 
future. The extension activity of INTA-Manfredi set it apart from EMBRASA, its Brazilian 
counterpart, which only does basic research and lacks the practical technological knowledge that 
results from experimentation on how to use the new technologies. Without extension activities 
by public institutions, the development and adoption of PA in Brazil occurred five years later 
than in Argentina.    
                                                 
63 The first technological innovations adopted were the satellite flaggers, both for pulverizers and airplanes, and the 
yield monitors. The application of variable dosage in seeding machines and fertilizing machines gathered strength 
starting in 2006. The acquisition and use of yield monitors and satellite flaggers in pulverizers respectively 
accounted for 25 and 42 percent of the total investment in PA equipment in 2007, which reached U$S31 million. On 
average, 50 percent of the PA equipment introduced was made in Argentina (Bragachini, 2008). However, the 
highest yearly rates of growth in the acquisition of PA equipment and components between 2003 and 2007 
corresponded to automatic guides (116 percent), and to the equipment used to administer variable doses in seeding 
machines and fertilizing machines (42 percent in the case of solid doses and 56 percent in the case of liquid doses). 
  45  This PDP is a vertical policy that provides a public input, facilitated by alignment of the 
public and private sector along this vertical interest. The private sector has formed an informal 
network that is embedded in the platform generated by INTA. 
 
4.8.6  The Role of INTA in the Emergence of a Local Industry of Precision Machines 
 
By diffusing PA, INTA generated a strong demand for precision machines and instruments. 
Nowadays, 50 percent of the equipment is produced domestically.
64 INTA also provided 
important technical information for the local development of axial harvesting machines that 
facilitated the development of the required sensors by the private sector. In this case, the private 
sector could have eventually acquired the needed information by itself, but there are fixed costs 
in the acquisition of this information, which then becomes a public good.
65  
 
5.  The Case of Biotechnology PDPs 
 
Biotechnology is the application of science and technology to living beings and to their parts, 
products, and models, with the goal of altering materials (either dead or alive) and using them to 
produce knowledge, goods, and/or services. Biotechnology involves the interaction of biology, 
genetics, biochemistry, virology, agronomy, engineering, chemistry, medicine, and veterinary 
medicine, among other disciplines.  
This sector includes biotech applied to human health (BHH), biotech applied to plants and 
animals (BPA) and biotechnology applied to food (BF). These activities entail a substantial 
                                                 
64 The first local developments included satellite flaggers, pulverizing machines, variable dose seeding machines and 
computers for pulverizers. The local production of flaggers was the first one to offer rapid positive profits, as they 
gave producers an instant improvement in their returns, which generated a large demand for this type of equipment. 
There currently are in operation 9,000 pulverizing equipments with satellite flaggers. 
65 One important factor when deciding whether to invest in PA machines is the availability of adequate mechanical, 
electronic, and agronomic service and assistance, which is often better supplied by local producers. Additionally 
INTA provides further assistance on these matters to local suppliers, reinforcing the attractiveness of investing in the 
adoption of these machines and technologies by agricultural producers. 
The local production of PA equipment got a boost from the 2002 devaluation, which favored import 
substitution. During this period, the firms that developed electronic and hydraulic equipment and highly complex 
machinery undertook important developments and gained substantial knowledge and competitiveness in the areas of 
control technologies and PA machines. As a result, many SMEs gained (technological) competitiveness in the 
development of controlling systems, which include seeding monitors, recorders of events or activities (speed map, 
harvest day, time of the day at which this activity is undertake), satellite flaggers, and others. In 2007, import 
substitution reached an estimated 60 percent of the available stock of PA equipment. 
  46amount of R&D, especially BHH.
66 They require highly skilled personnel with research skills 
adequate for commercial labs and long-term financing for risky ventures. 
  Biotechnology in Argentina is a relatively big success story. It is the result of an 
entrepreneurial effort of the private sector that exploits the combination of comparative 
advantages and accumulated capacity with a few very important public inputs. There were no 
vertical PDPs to support this sector, but private firms were able to exploit horizontal PDPs such 
as FONTAR and the provision of relevant public inputs by INTA and CONABIA to accelerate 
the growth of the sector and to move toward the creation of platforms. 
The market and government failures that hurt the sector differ by biotech branches. Thus, 
the different branches sometimes need different policies and public inputs, and sometimes their 
needs conflict with each other. Even within each branch the PDP’s needs are different.  
The branch with the greatest innovative intensity is BHH (R&D spending represents 16 
percent of sales of biotech products), followed by transgenic seeds (6 percent of sales), animal 
health (3 percent), inoculants (2 percent), and food ingredients for bioprocessing (1.5 percent). 
The overall innovation intensity for all biotech branches is 5.3 percent of sales of biotech 
products, much larger than the average for the manufacturing sector (0.3 percent). 
 
5.1 Biotechnology Applied to Human Health 
 
Argentina is currently one of the leaders among developing countries in the area of BHH. Its 
leadership emerged through the pioneering research activities of a large national pharmaceutical 
laboratory. Technological know-how is highly proprietary, and there has been relatively little 
diffusion of this activity, which is concentrated in a few big labs (see Sánchez et al., 2008). 
New developments are done by a few large local firms. Foreign firms commercialize 
products developed abroad. There are a large number of small firms, many of which still do not 
produce BHH goods but have shown important advances in R&D. However, they face serious 
difficulties in taking these developments to the production and commercialization stage. 
 In the United States, SME labs do projects for large consolidated firms, who finance 
them. In Argentina, very few of the BHH SMEs had any prior or systematic interaction with 
large firms, although they can still sell them their discoveries at any stage of development. Large 
                                                 
66 In the case of BHH products, there is no possibility of copying. Each lab that wants to replicate a pre-existing 
product only knows the characteristics of that product, but must do its own R&D to develop it. In this case, imitation 
only avoids the commercial and clinical risk, but the technological risk is unavoidable. 
  47and small firms are linked mostly through the outsourcing of some processes that large firms do 
not undertake themselves. This scant interaction is due to the relatively small number of large 
firms interested in doing new projects, and to the scarce supply of capable smaller research 
groups or labs that can undertake systematic research.  
The largest market failure that hurts this sector is the scarcity of financing, although the 
sector has also required the provision of some relevant public inputs such as establishing the 
right standards and control mechanisms for different BHH products and the availability of life 
scientists in the public sector that could be redeployed to commercial labs. 
 
5.2 Biotechnology Applied to Plants and Animals 
BPA was introduced in Argentina by multinational corporations in some branches and by local 
firms in others. Food biotech was started by a joint venture between one of the largest food 
producers in Argentina and an American firm, which got involved in the production of 
recombinant enzymes for the food industry. Local firms pioneered the application of micro-
propagation techniques (cloning) in the area of vegetables. Two multinational firms introduced a 
gene for local varieties of soy that is resistant to glyphosate (a strong herbicide), which allowed 
the commercial launching of transgenic RR soy in the mid-1990s (Bisang, 2007). These 
developments were facilitated by the existence of institutions specialized in R&D activities for 
the agricultural sector, such as INTA, and by the availability of geneticists and agronomic 
engineers.  
The majority of national firms who do biotechnological research work in the area of 
animal health. In the area of micro-propagation, a subsidiary of a multinational corporation 
coexists with a small number of small firms, which are mostly spinoffs of universities or public 
research agencies. Most of the work is done by the national firms. The production of transgenic 
seeds includes two groups of players: the local firms that develop new varieties and the firms that 
have genomic knowledge and the technologies for incorporating the genomes into seeds. The 
generation of new varieties that are adapted to local soils and climates is done by domestic firms, 
whereas the development of genes tends to be done by all players. The genetically modified 
organisms (GMO) approved in Argentina are developed abroad and transferred to Argentina.
67 
                                                 
67 The interaction among local firms is low, but there is a certain complementarity between national and foreign 
firms. The majority of domestic firms are stronger in the area of phyto-improvements, while the multinational firms 
specialize in developing genomic knowledge and incorporating the external genes to the seed. Firms that develop 
  48This sector is relatively less intensive in financing than BHH, but it is more intensive in 
the use of public inputs in the forms of technological transfers and assistance provided by INTA 
and other public institutions and universities, and it is also more dependent on having the right 
regulatory framework and IPR, as knowledge is much less proprietary than in BHH. 
 
5.3 The Role of Financing 
The financing constraint hurts because of the long horizon and risk of the R&D projects until the 
new product or process is fully developed (a typical R&D project in BHH may last up to seven 
years). It also hurts because of the relatively large costs to do the industrial scaling up and 
commercial implementation, which prevents the completion of many developments. In the 
United States, SMEs are financed through systematic contracting of R&D services by large firms 
and to a lesser extent by venture capital funds. These financing channels are absent in 
Argentina.
68 
FONTAR and FONCYT compensate for this partially through their past contingent 
repayment loans, the tax credits and the CAEFIPP loans of FONTAR and a batch of FONCYT 
instruments. Biotech projects captured 13 percent of the FONCYT grants to finance research 
between 1997 and 2003. Between 2000 and 2003, 67 percent of the FONCYT biotech funding 
was applied to BPA projects and 33 percent to BHH. This distribution was reversed for 
FONTAR funding, which allocated 67 percent of the biotech funds to BHH projects. This 
allocation makes sense, as BPA is more intensive in public inputs and research that is not 
commercially driven, which are typically financed by FONCYT, while BHH is more intensive in 
research and technological innovation that is directly applicable to production and commercial 
activities. However, this support is not sufficient.  Additionally, large firms also demand a large 
amount of credit that is not readily available.  
The main source of financing for large firms comes from the reinvestment of profits or 
from capitalization by their owners. Nevertheless, large firms use FONTAR funding as a 
complement to their own funding.
69 While the ANPCyT grants relatively large loans per project, 
                                                                                                                                                             
and commercialize the different GMOs also commercialize production inputs such as agrochemicals and fertilizers, 
which is important to ensure the loyalty of customers. 
68 In Argentina the most conspicuous exit options when the project cannot be scaled up by the SME are to sell the 
projects to large traditional laboratories, which limits the scope for bigger diffusion of this activity. 
69 Some large BHH and BPA firms get additional funding from issuing private equity, but this mechanism is not yet 
well developed and promoted. One of these firms has highlighted that it would be highly convenient to allow tax 
  49in the majority of cases this funding is not sufficient to finance the final stages of many research 
projects. 
The Ministry of Science and Technology has a program that aims at creating a system of 
venture capital investment (SICAR), which is based on allowing investors to take a 50 percent 
tax credit on their contributions to the venture capital fund. The goal is to make the investors 
partners of the different projects, especially technological start-ups, through the provision of 
upside incentives. However, the shallow capital market of Argentina may prevent SICAR from 
becoming a true alleviation of this constraint.  
 
5.4  The Provision of Public Inputs for BPA 
Genetically modified (GM) crops were introduced in Argentina in 1996, when the National 
Commission on Agricultural Biotechnology (CONABIA) authorized the release of transgenic 
soy that is resistant to the herbicide glyphosate.
70 The creation of CONABIA in 1991 in response 
to the application by a multinational corporation for the approval of the release of transgenic soy, 
cotton, and corn was an important institutional innovation that allowed an evaluation of the 
GMO almost simultaneously with the United States, and permitted the early adoption of this type 
of technology. This approval set in motion a large growth in the development, testing, and 
approval of new varieties. The most disseminated GM crops are corn, soy, sunflower and cotton. 
After the approval of these GM crops, there was an intense dissemination campaign that 
accelerated the adoption of these technologies in Argentina. The technological change was huge, 
both in terms of its impact on yields and the adoption of the new technologies. Genetically 
modified crops now represent 90 percent of all soy plantations, 70 percent of the corn planted 
area and 60 percent of the cotton planted area. This large technological change was facilitated by 
the institutional capabilities to undertake thorough analyses of the risk and biosafety issues 
linked to the release of these GMOs.
71 
                                                                                                                                                             
deductions on the capitalizations of the firm done by shareholders as a way to provide bigger incentives to 
capitalization. 
70 The CONABIA advises the Secretary of Agriculture on technical requirements and biosafety conditions that must 
be met by the genetic materials obtained by biotech methods. CONABIA is staffed by representatives from the 
public and private sectors involved in agricultural biotech. 
71 The Secretary of Agriculture has a Biotechnology Office, created in 2004, that assists private firms in the 
management of matters related to biotechnology and biosafety, especially regarding authorizations to release and 
commercialize vegetable organisms and/or animals that have been genetically modified, and which originate in the 
agricultural sector. The biotech office organizes activities of communication, training and technical assistance. 
 
  50There is intense private-public interaction for the provision of other relevant ISPG. This 
interaction, led by the private sector, started with private projects that received technological 
assistance from INTA, which is highly valued by the private firms that we interviewed that do 
research in these areas. They consider that INTA is relatively well endowed in terms of the 
technical capabilities of its researchers and technicians and the physical and technological 
infrastructure to undertake different tests. Many private and public research projects in the area 
of BPA currently have AT agreements with INTA. 
All of the firms that do research in BPA interact with public research institutes and 
regulatory agencies in different ways, ranging from broad, formal  research cooperation 
agreements to cooperation on specific projects and to the hiring of public sector researchers for 
specific projects. There are no formal, well oiled mechanisms for enabling this interaction. It is 
done by appealing to individuals who interface with firms and public research groups.  There 




The Emergence of Platforms in the Bioagricultural Sector 
The most important platform is represented by the Institute of Agrobiotechnology of Rosario (INDEAR), 
which is a private endeavor partnered by Bioceres and Biosidus, leading private firms in BPA. The project 
also includes the participation of CONICET, which allowed the construction of the INDEAR building in its 
Regional Center for R&D Rosario (CERIDER). This partnership facilitates the generation of spillovers 
between INDEAR and CERIDER. CONICET will also contribute with the participation of its 
biotechnology researchers through its externship program. The goal of INDEAR is to become an institution 
of reference in the fields of molecular biology, functional genomics and proteomics applied to 
technological innovation in the local agricultural sector (in this they would compete with MNCs). The 
foreseen products will be GMO of vegetal origin, to be transferred to start-up firms. INDEAR will also 
develop a technological platform in the area of services such as bio-informatics, DNA sequencing, 
microbiology, and cultivation of vegetable knits, among others. INDEAR received support from the 
ANPCyT, which classified it as a strategic association between the private and public sectors. Through an 
ARAI of FONTAR the Agency loaned INDEAR AR$5 million for the construction of the building and 
AR$600,000 through five ANR. The Agency also chose INDEAR to participate in Strategic Areas Project 
(PAE) of FONCYT, which will allow it to interact with public research institutions in the area of soils 
metagenomics, and to lend its last generation DNA sequencing equipment to the public sector. INDEAR 
was expected to start working in early 2009, and to employ 100 staff.  
  
                                                 
72 These cases include the different AT and CVT agreements with INTA, the Instituto Cerela, and the César Milstein 
Research Center, among others. We can also highlight the cooperation between Biosidus and: a) Fundación Favaloro 
(an NGO) in research on gene therapy for angiogenesis, b) INVAP and the Dirección Nacional de la Antártida to 
find microorganisms that adapt to cold temperatures and which can be applied to different industries such as textiles, 
chemistry and biofuels, among others.  
  51The Cooperative Innovative Efforts of Bioceres 
 Bioceres is a private firm that focuses on the development, production, and commercialization of seeds, 
acting as a nexus between the public and the private sector. It currently has 150 shareholders, mostly 
agricultural producers. The firm has a small staff that is focused on bringing together the research efforts 
of the private and public sectors. 
One example of this articulation is the joint venture between Bioceres and INTA in developing 
transgenic corn that is resistant to certain local viruses.
73 Another important project of Bioceres is the 
development of varieties of wheat, corn, and soy that are resistant to drought. This research is being done 
through an agreement with the National University of Litoral (based in Rosario) and the CONICET.
74 It 
cooperates with these two institutions in the design of new genetic tools for plants. It also participates in 
three strategic area programs promoted by the ANPCyT that seek to promote the interaction of 
knowledge-generating institutions in the cultivation of wheat and sunflower and in the genomic 
exploration of soils. Finally, Bioceres has the joint venture with Biosidus, with the participation of 
CONICET, in the creation of the Instituto de Agrobiotecnología Rosario (INDEAR).  
  
In addition to the research joint-ventures with the private sector, INTA offers technical 
assistance in the area of BPA. Since 1994, it has run the National Program of Advanced 
Biotechnology (PNBA), where research on genomics, proteomics and bio-informatics is 
undertaken. 
The Polo de Biotecnología de Rosario coordinates the actions of public and private sector 
actors in this geographic area, including private firms, the local, provincial, and national 
governments, international agencies, and the ANPCyT. The relevant stakeholders of this 
institution include the Instituto Biotecnológico de Rosario (which is part of CONICET), 
INDEAR, and an incubator of biotech firms. This effort concentrates, together with INTA, the 
largest amount of financial and human resources for research in the vegetable area of biotech. 
 
5.5  The Role of IPR 
During the 1990s, Argentina modified its legal patent system with the aim of strengthening the 
rights of inventors and the scope of protection. However there are still important restrictions on 
the patentability of living beings. As distinct from the United States, in Argentina industrial 
                                                 
73 The project is being undertaken in the Instituto de Biotecnología and the Instituto de Genética de INTA Castelar. 
It is being financed  by private investors in the form of venture capital. These investors will participate in the future 
profits generated by this effort. Field tests are currently underway. The agreement between Bioceres and INTA 
grants the former the exclusive commercialization rights, which can then be sub-licensed to other firms that 
commercialize seeds. 
74 Thus far they have developed a gene of sunflower seeds that is resistant to drought and salinity. The financing of 
the first two stages of this process was done by Bioceres, while the continuation to stages 3 and 4 in September 2003 
required the establishment of a specific investment fund of U$S1.6 million, which was in the form of private equity. 
  52protection is denied to plants, animals, and biological processes and to discoveries in this area.
75 
Hence, biotech patents do not reflect the universe of innovations and inventions in this area, but 
only a relatively small subset of them, especially in the case of vegetable varieties, which receive 
only weaker IPRs. 
The acquisition of technological knowledge through R&D in BHH remains highly 
proprietary, and local developments are more process innovations (replication through R&D) 
than patentable product innovations. Additionally, most Argentine exports have targeted non-IP 
countries. Hence, innovative activity in BHH is less sensitive to IPRs. In the case of BPA, 
technological spillovers are much larger and there is a greater possibility of copying, both for 
supplying the domestic market and for exporting. Thus, INTA strives to strengthen the IPRs for 
BPA inventions.  
Since the change in the patent laws, only 6 percent of the patent applications presented to 
the National Institute of Intellectual Protection (INPI) corresponded to biotech (which is one of 
the most inventive and innovative industries), and only 1.7 percent of these applications were 
approved. The rest were either denied, or the applicant abandoned its pursuit, or they are still 
under technical evaluation. Local residents account for 15 percent of the biotech patents granted, 
while the rest belong to foreigners. Besides the restrictions placed by the Argentine patent law, 
local innovators and inventors are not accustomed to patenting their inventions or discoveries.  
Many small firms are not aware of the scope of the law and of the importance of patenting newly 
developed knowledge. FONTAR attempts to compensate partially for these shortcomings by 
offering non-reimbursable grants to finance the cost of patenting. Additionally, INPI lacks 
competent evaluators for biotech patents, thanks to the relatively few applications, which in turn 
are the result of the law and the shortcomings of INPI.
76  
The insufficient protection of IPRs in the BPA area is highly detrimental to further 
innovation in the sector. For instance, there is a large “white bag market” that commercializes 
seeds that are not provided by licensed seed traders but rather by agricultural producers that sell 
their own harvested seeds without respecting IPRs. According to members of CONABIA, there 
                                                 
75 There are sizable differences across countries regarding the criteria for patenting, which are related to novelty, 
degree of invention and industrial application. In the case of biotech these differences are exacerbated by the 
diverging views regarding the limits that should be placed on the private appropriation of goods that are part of 
nature and/or human life, and hence should be public. 
76 According to the present law, the rights over the invention are not valid until the patent is approved. This may 
leave the inventor unprotected for a period of up to four years between the patent application and the time of its 
approval, which is long enough for the invention to be copied. 
  53are currently many products that are not commercialized because of the absence of patent 
protection. 
 
5.6  The Law on Promotion of Modern Biotechnology 
The success of this sector, the proactive behavior of private sector stakeholders, the growing 
number of platforms and public-private cooperation, and the receptivity of the government have 
led to the enactment of a law that creates biotech-specific PDPs. This 2007 law will be valid for 
15 years and will be implemented by the Ministry of Economy.  
The benefits granted include subsidies/tax breaks for R&D and acquisition of capital 
goods and hiring of research personnel for specific biotech projects. The law also creates a fund 
that will finance (at a subsidized cost) the start-up capital for new entrepreneurs whose projects 
are at the research or production stages and which are candidates to qualify for the benefits of 
this law.
77 It also includes a Fiduciary Promotion Fund that will finance research activities and 
which is funded with taxes paid by the participating firms.  
The law has been considered by existing firms as having introduced a good set of 
instruments to promote both the emergence of new developments and the consolidation of 
existing ones.  
 
5.7  Human Capital 
Argentina is relatively well endowed with highly qualified R&D personnel and technicians that 
meet the requirements of private firms. However, there is still a shortage of scientists capable of 
working for private firms, and of technology managers.
78 There is still a gap between the more 
autonomous research activities in the public sector and the needs of biotech SMEs. Despite 
CONICET’s externship programs, this gap has not been eliminated. The Ministry of Science and 
Technology is supporting a project to develop managers in the private sector who are both 
technically knowledgeable and trained in business administration in important universities 
abroad. 
  
                                                 
77 This fund will be financed with resources coming from: a) the national budget, b) donations, c) non-reimbursable 
funds provided by multilateral organizations, foreign governments or NGOs, and d) reimbursements from the 
beneficiaries of this law. The law additionally creates a Consulting Commission which will include representatives 
of the public and private sectors. 
78 Scientists that moved from academia to the private sector remarked on the difficulties in adapting to the corporate 
world and in finding compatibility between the two ways of working, which are completely different. 
  545.8  Relevance of PDPs for Biotechnology 
 
There is no vertical policy for the sector, except for the recent biotechnology law. Instead, there 
is a collection of horizontal policies that were used by private firms to accelerate the growth of 
their sectors. There are a few important public inputs that were crucial for the takeoff of these 
sectors, such as the emergence of a regulatory agency in the early 1990s that was adept at 
evaluating the risks and approving the release of genetically modified seeds, and a number of 
public sector researchers in the area of life sciences. Financing by FONTAR and technology 
transfers by INTA have helped, although they are still insufficient. A very interesting feature is 
the emerging interaction between private firms and public institutions in research, most often led 
by the private sector and occurring mostly in BPA. This is leading to the creation of 
technological platforms in the sector and to growing cooperation in the design of new PDPs. The 
design and implementation of an appropriate intellectual property regime is still needed. 
 
6.  Conclusions 
 
The PDPs analyzed here (FONTAR and INTA) are relatively small vis-à-vis the dominant PDP 
programs in Argentina (financing to SMEs, export promotion programs, financing of investment, 
etc.), but they are more successful. They managed to survive macroeconomic distress, to display 
important policy learning, and to achieve their goals. However their impacts are often limited by 
the lack of coordination with other public agencies that matter for the supported sector or 
activity, and by government failures. They also facilitate the emergence of platforms for the 
continuous technological modernization of different sectors rather than the expansion or survival 
of traditional activities. These PDPs also display important degrees of public-private cooperation 
and transmission of private sector needs regarding public inputs and market interventions. The 
successful emergence of biotechnology in Argentina was based on private sector initiative 
(especially in biopharmaceuticals) and on the use of both vertical and horizontal PDPs, which it 
has used to create and consolidate platforms (especially in the case of biotechnology applied to 
plants and animals). 
  
  55These PDPs yield the following lessons: 
•  “Small and local” PDPs are good for solving coordination failures and for an 
adequate matching of instruments and failures. 
•  The PDPs are likelier to succeed when they are flexible and varied enough to 
adapt to the needs of different types of firms and different classes of projects, 
as in the case of FONTAR’s instruments, which also facilitates the formation 
of platforms.  
•  In many cases the presence of committed stakeholders that break the status 
quo or that manage to maintain and upgrade policies in an unstable 
policymaking scenario was crucial. 
•  PDPs often times have to compensate for government failures (as in the case 
of innovation), which limit them to obtaining only some micro success. 
•  The dearth of tenured positions in intervening agencies conspires against the 
success of the PDPs. Idiosyncratic factors such as commitment and prestige of 
the agency have to compensate for the precariousness of employment. 
•  The relative impact of market interventions vis-à-vis public inputs depends on 
the characteristics of the supported sector and activities. For instance, in 
biotech applied to plants and animals the provision of public inputs 
(technology transfers) is more important than in the case of biotech applied to 
human health, where financing is more important. 
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